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1.1 root 1: #print
2: Now that you know what word is wrong, you still have to find
3: it in one of the memo files so you can correct it. One way
4: is to use the text editor "ex", but that is rather slow. Better
5: is to use the pattern-finding program "grep", which looks through
6: a set of files to find a particular word. To find all occurrences
7: of "glop" in the files tom, dick and harry, you need only type
8:
9: grep 'glop' tom dick harry
10:
11: The first thing is the word that grep is to search for;
12: any remaining names are file names, which are searched in order.
13: The quotes around the word to be searched for aren't
14: always necessary, but it's a good habit to use them
15: anyway. Later on we'll see some examples where they are really
16: needed.
17:
18: Use grep to find the memo file that contains the spelling error,
19: and type "answer name", where "name" is the file you decide on.
20: #create memo1
21: (This comes from a federalist paper by alexander hamilton.)
22: It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
23: from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business
24: of appointments, that it would contribute to the
25: stability of the administration. The consent of that body
26: would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A
27: change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion
28: so violent or so general a revolution in the officers
29: of the government as might be expected if he were the
30: sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had
31: given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
32: President would be restrained from attempting a change
33: in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension
34: that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate
35: the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit
36: upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of
37: a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a
38: provision which connects the official existence of public
39: men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body
40: which, from the greater permanency of its own composition,
41: will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
42: than any other member of the government.
43: To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
44: article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested
45: that it would serve to give the President an undue
46: influence over the Senate, and in others that it would
47: have an opposite tendency - a strong proof that neither
48: suggestion is true.
49: To state the first in its proper form is to refute it. It
50: amounts to this: the President would have an improper
51: influence over the Senate, because the Senate would
52: have the power of restraining him. This is an absurdity in
53: terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power
54: of appointment would enable him much more effectually
55: to establish a dangerous empire over that body than a
56: mere power of nomination subject to their control.
57: Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
58: "the Senate would influence the executive." As I have
59: had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness
60: of the objection forbids a precise answer. In
61: what manner is this influence to be exerted? In relation
62: to what objects? The power of influencing a person, in
63: the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of
64: conferring a benefit upon him. How could the Senate
65: confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing
66: their right of negative upon his nominations? If it
67: be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence
68: in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a
69: different conduct, I answer that the instances in which the
70: President could be personally interested in the result would
71: be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the
72: #create memo2
73: compliances of the Senate. Besides this, it is evident that
74: the POWER which can originate the disposition of honors
75: and emoluments is more likely to attract than to be attracted
76: by the POWER which can merely obstruct their
77: course. If by influencing the President be want restraining
78: him, this is precisely what must have been intended.
79: And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary,
80: at the same time that it would not be such as to
81: destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled
82: agency of that magistrate. The right of nomination
83: would produce all the good, without the ill.
84: Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of
85: the officers of the proposed government with that which
86: is established by the constitution of this State, a decided
87: preference must be given to the former. In that plan the
88: power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the executive.
89: And as there would be a necessity for submitting
90: each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of
91: the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
92: from the mode of conducting it, would naturally
93: become matters of notoriety, and the public would
94: be at no loss to determine what part had been performed
95: by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination
96: would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The
97: censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the
98: door of the senate, aggravated by the consideration
99: of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
100: executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive,
101: for nominating, and the Senate, for approving,
102: would participate, though in different degrees, in the
103: opprobrium and disgrace.
104: The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment
105: in this State. The council of appointment consists
106: of from three to five persons, of whom the governor
107: is always one. This small body, shut up in a private
108: apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the
109: execution of the trust committed to them. It is known
110: that the governor claims the right of nomination upon
111: the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the Constitution;
112: but it is not known to what extent, or in what
113: manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is
114: contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad appointment,
115: on account of the uncertainty of its author and for
116: want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor
117: duration. And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue
118: lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost. The
119: most that the public can know is that the governor
120: claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable
121: number of four men can too often be managed
122: without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
123: #create memo3
124: particular council should happen to be of an uncomplying
125: character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their
126: opposition by regulating the times of meeting in such a
127: manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and
128: that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great
129: number of very improper appointments are from time to
130: time made. Whether a governor of this State avails himself
131: of the ascendant, he must necessarily have in this
132: delicate and important part of the administration to prefer
133: to offices men who are best qualified for them; or
134: whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement
135: of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to
136: his will and to the support of a despicable and dangerous
137: system of personal influence are questions which, unfortunately
138: for the community, can only be the subjects
139: of speculation and conjecture.
140: Every mere council of appointment, however constituted,
141: will be a conclave in which cabal and intrigue will
142: have their full scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable
143: increase of expense, cannot be large enough to
144: preclude a facility of combination. And as each member
145: will have his friends and connections to provide for,
146: the desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous
147: bartering of votes and bargaining for places. The private
148: attachments of one man might easily be satisfied, but to
149: satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty
150: men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments
151: of the government in a few families and
152: would lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy
153: than any measure that could be contrived. If, to avoid an
154: accumulation of offices, there was to be a frequent change
155: in the persons who were to be a frequent change
156: in the persons who were to compose the council, this
157: would involve the mischiefs of a mutable administration
158: in their full extent. Such a council would also be more
159: liable to executive influence than the Senate, because
160: they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately
161: under the public inspection. Such a council, in
162: fine, as a substitute for the plan of the convention, would
163: be productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication
164: of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in
165: the distribution of public honors, a decrease of stability
166: in the administration of the government, and a diminution
167: of the security against an undue influence of the
168: executive. And yet such a council has been warmly contended
169: for as an essential amendment in the proposed
170: Constitution.
171: I could not with propriety conclude my observations
172: on the subject of appointments without taking notice of
173: a scheme for which there have appeared some, though
174: #create memo4
175: but a few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House of
176: Representatives in the power of making them. I shall,
177: however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot
178: imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of any
179: considerable part of the community. A body so fluctuating
180: and at the same time so numerous can never be
181: deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness
182: will appear manifest to all when it is recollected that
183: in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred
184: persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the
185: Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this
186: union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be
187: occasioned. The exampled of most of the States in their
188: local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea.
189: The only remaining powers of the executive are comprehended
190: in giving information to Congress of the state
191: of the Union; in recommending to their consideration
192: such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening
193: them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in
194: adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon
195: the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and
196: other public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws;
197: and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.
198: Except some cavils about the power of convening either
199: house of the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors,
200: no objection has been made to this class of
201: authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any. It required,
202: indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure to invent
203: exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to. In
204: regard to the power of convening either house of the legislature
205: I shall barely remark that in respect to the Senate,
206: at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it. As
207: this body has a concurrent power with the executive in
208: the article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call
209: it together with a view to this object, when it would be
210: unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives.
211: As to the reception of ambassadors, what I
212: have said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
213: We have now completed a survy of the structure and
214: powers of the executive department which, I have endeavored
215: to show, combines, as far as republican principles
216: will admit, all the requisites to energy. The
217: remaining inquiry is: does it also combine the requisites
218: to safety, in the republican sense - due dependence on
219: the people, a due responsibility? The answer to this question
220: has been anticipated in the investigation of its other
221: characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these
222: circumstances; the election of the President once in four
223: years by persons immediately chosen by the people for
224: that purpose, and his being at all times liable to impeachment,
225: trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve
226: in any other, and to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent
227: prosecution in the common course of law. But
228: these precautions, great as they are, are not the only
229: ones which the plan of the convention has provided in
230: favor of the public security. In the only instances in which
231: the abuse of the executive authority was materially to be
232: feared, the chief Magistrate of the United States, would,
233: by that plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of
234: the legislative body. What more can an enlightened and
235: reasonable people desire?
236: #copyin
237: #user
238: #uncopyin
239: #match memo4
240: #log
241: #next
242: 1.1c 10
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