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1.1 root 1: #print
2: Unix has several rather simple programs that are useful
3: in their own right and as building blocks in more complicated
4: operations. One of the most frequently used is "wc",
5: which counts lines, words, and characters in files.
6: If you say
7: wc file
8: or
9: wc <file
10: wc will print three numbers: the number of
11: lines, words and characters in the file.
12: (Some systems have an obsolete version of "wc" that
13: doesn't count the characters.)
14: If there is more than one file, as in
15: wc file1 file2 file3 file4
16: then wc will list the counts for each file separately,
17: and the total.
18:
19: What is the total number of words
20: in the two files whose names begin with "memo"?
21: Type "answer N", where N is the number of words.
22: #create memo1
23: It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
24: from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business
25: of appointments, that it would contribute to the
26: stability of the administration. The consent of that body
27: would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A
28: change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion
29: so violent or so general a revolution in the officers
30: of the government as might be expected if he were the
31: sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had
32: given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
33: President would be restrained from attempting a change
34: in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension
35: that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate
36: the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit
37: upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of
38: a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a
39: provision which connects the official existence of public
40: men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body
41: which, from the greater permanency of its own composition,
42: will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
43: than any other member of the government.
44: To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
45: article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested
46: that it would serve to give the President an undue
47: influence over the Senate, and in others that it would
48: have an opposite tendency - a strong proof that neither
49: suggestion is true.
50: To state the first in its proper form is to refute it. It
51: amounts to this: the President would have an improper
52: influence over the Senate, because the Senate would
53: have the power of restraining him. This is an absurdity in
54: terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power
55: of appointment would enable him much more effectually
56: to establish a dangerous empire over that body than a
57: mere power of nomination subject to their control.
58: Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
59: "the Senate would influence the executive." As I have
60: had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness
61: of the objection forbids a precise answer. In
62: what manner is this influence to be exerted? In relation
63: to what objects? The power of influencing a person, in
64: the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of
65: conferring a benefit upon him. How could the Senate
66: confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing
67: their right of negative upon his nominations? If it
68: be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence
69: in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a
70: different conduct, I answer that the instances in which the
71: President could be personally interested in the result would
72: be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the
73: #create memo2
74: compliances of the Senate. Besides this, it is evident that
75: the POWER which can originate the disposition of honors
76: and emoluments is more likely to attract than to be attracted
77: by the POWER which can merely obstruct their
78: course. If by influencing the President be want restraining
79: him, this is precisely what must have been intended.
80: And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary,
81: at the same time that it would not be such as to
82: destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled
83: agency of that magistrate. The right of nomination
84: would produce all the good, without the ill.
85: Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of
86: the officers of the proposed government with that which
87: is established by the constitution of this State, a decided
88: preference must be given to the former. In that plan the
89: power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the executive.
90: And as there would be a necessity for submitting
91: each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of
92: the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
93: from the mode of conducting it, would naturally
94: become matters of notoriety, and the public would
95: be at no loss to determine what part had been performed
96: by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination
97: would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The
98: censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the
99: door of the senate, aggravated by the consideration
100: of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
101: executive. If an ill appointment should be made, the executive,
102: for nominating, and the Senate, for approving,
103: would participate, though in different degrees, in the
104: opprobrium and disgrace.
105: The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment
106: in this State. The council of appointment consists
107: of from three to five persons, of whom the governor
108: is always one. This small body, shut up in a private
109: apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the
110: execution of the trust committed to them. It is known
111: that the governor claims the right of nomination upon
112: the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the Constitution;
113: but it is not known to what extent, or in what
114: manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is
115: contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad appointment,
116: on account of the uncertainty of its author and for
117: want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor
118: duration. And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue
119: lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost. The
120: most that the public can know is that the governor
121: claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable
122: number of four men can too often be managed
123: without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
124: #copyin
125: #user
126: #uncopyin
127: #match 949
128: #log
129: #next
130: 4.1e 10
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