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1.1 ! root 1: (Message inbox:17) ! 2: Replied: Tue, 17 Oct 89 10:47:51 +0100 ! 3: Replied: [email protected] ! 4: Received: from vs6.cs.ucl.ac.uk by pyr1.Cs.Ucl.AC.UK via Ethernet with SMTP ! 5: id aa02057; 16 Oct 89 18:44 GMT-0:00 ! 6: To: Jon Crowcroft <[email protected]> ! 7: cc: [email protected] ! 8: Subject: Re: Moron X Window protocol on ISODE TS ! 9: In-reply-to: Jon Crowcroft's message of Mon, 16 Oct 89 11:45:46 +0100. ! 10: Date: Mon, 16 Oct 89 18:42:41 +0100 ! 11: From: Mike Roe <[email protected]> ! 12: Source-Info: toast.cs.ucl.ac.uk ! 13: ! 14: ! 15: > >2. (possibly related) addressing. ! 16: > >X uses user friendly names for m/c:displays.# ! 17: > >What would you advise i use as T-SAPs and does this go in one of the ! 18: > >magic isoentities/isoservices files? - i need loadsa help on that part ! 19: > >of the junk. ! 20: ! 21: a. isoservices is only used for dynamic servers (those started by tsapd). ! 22: ! 23: b. The choice of TSEL is vital only for dynamic servers (tsapd looks at it ! 24: to decide what to exec). For a static server over RFC-1006 transport, the ! 25: IP address will uniquely identify the server (choose whatever you like ! 26: as a TSEL -- it can't clash with anything else). If ! 27: you've got a real OSI TS in the kernel, though, the TSEL matters even for ! 28: static servers. I'd use string selectors "X0", "X1" etc. ! 29: ! 30: c. It sounds like you need an entry in isoentities for each display. Something ! 31: like: ! 32: ! 33: vs1 xserver0 <random object identifier> "" "" "X0" ! 34: TCP vs1 <port> ! 35: ! 36: BEWARE: The format may be different in ISODE 6.0. ! 37: ! 38: I don't know whether you'll need a separate port for each display or not. ! 39: ! 40: > (*dah dah) Authentication ! 41: ! 42: It looks like you should be using transport layer encryption here. (Rather ! 43: than presentation layer, as used by X.500 for example). ! 44: ! 45: The big problem with T-layer encryption is how you exchange session keys: ! 46: I dont know of any agreed method for doing this. Also, the CR is probably ! 47: not big enough to hold an authenticator. ! 48: ! 49: A thought has just occurred to me: ! 50: **** Session layer encryption **** ! 51: ! 52: The security architecture (ISO 7498-2-1988(E)) is of the opinion that the ! 53: session layer cannot be used to provide any security service. However, it ! 54: now seems to me that providing encryption at the same level as dialog ! 55: control is a perfectly natural thing to do: Consider for example ! 56: expedited data, or recovery after a T-later failure. The session layer is ! 57: particularly well-placed to know which part of the key-stream to use.o ! 58: ! 59: Also, it means you can use a Transport Service Bridge ... ! 60: ! 61: ! 62: > >4. does anyone have the T-Serice part of the ISODE manual i could ! 63: > >borrow? ! 64: ! 65: Ok, you can borrow mine. ! 66: ! 67: > 5. Has anyone looked at non blocking T-Service - X requires this to ! 68: > run well (though it can run over blocking), luckily it doesnt require ! 69: > asynch (phew), but it does like doing writes (T-DATA-REQ's) without ! 70: > haning around... (the converse, polling for reads seems ok since i can ! 71: > use ?select i spose...)? ! 72: ! 73: Non-blocking session could be quite entertaining... ! 74: (Non-deadlocking session was bad enough). ! 75: ! 76: ! 77: Mike
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