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1.1 root 1: (Message inbox:17)
2: Replied: Tue, 17 Oct 89 10:47:51 +0100
3: Replied: [email protected]
4: Received: from vs6.cs.ucl.ac.uk by pyr1.Cs.Ucl.AC.UK via Ethernet with SMTP
5: id aa02057; 16 Oct 89 18:44 GMT-0:00
6: To: Jon Crowcroft <[email protected]>
7: cc: [email protected]
8: Subject: Re: Moron X Window protocol on ISODE TS
9: In-reply-to: Jon Crowcroft's message of Mon, 16 Oct 89 11:45:46 +0100.
10: Date: Mon, 16 Oct 89 18:42:41 +0100
11: From: Mike Roe <[email protected]>
12: Source-Info: toast.cs.ucl.ac.uk
13:
14:
15: > >2. (possibly related) addressing.
16: > >X uses user friendly names for m/c:displays.#
17: > >What would you advise i use as T-SAPs and does this go in one of the
18: > >magic isoentities/isoservices files? - i need loadsa help on that part
19: > >of the junk.
20:
21: a. isoservices is only used for dynamic servers (those started by tsapd).
22:
23: b. The choice of TSEL is vital only for dynamic servers (tsapd looks at it
24: to decide what to exec). For a static server over RFC-1006 transport, the
25: IP address will uniquely identify the server (choose whatever you like
26: as a TSEL -- it can't clash with anything else). If
27: you've got a real OSI TS in the kernel, though, the TSEL matters even for
28: static servers. I'd use string selectors "X0", "X1" etc.
29:
30: c. It sounds like you need an entry in isoentities for each display. Something
31: like:
32:
33: vs1 xserver0 <random object identifier> "" "" "X0"
34: TCP vs1 <port>
35:
36: BEWARE: The format may be different in ISODE 6.0.
37:
38: I don't know whether you'll need a separate port for each display or not.
39:
40: > (*dah dah) Authentication
41:
42: It looks like you should be using transport layer encryption here. (Rather
43: than presentation layer, as used by X.500 for example).
44:
45: The big problem with T-layer encryption is how you exchange session keys:
46: I dont know of any agreed method for doing this. Also, the CR is probably
47: not big enough to hold an authenticator.
48:
49: A thought has just occurred to me:
50: **** Session layer encryption ****
51:
52: The security architecture (ISO 7498-2-1988(E)) is of the opinion that the
53: session layer cannot be used to provide any security service. However, it
54: now seems to me that providing encryption at the same level as dialog
55: control is a perfectly natural thing to do: Consider for example
56: expedited data, or recovery after a T-later failure. The session layer is
57: particularly well-placed to know which part of the key-stream to use.o
58:
59: Also, it means you can use a Transport Service Bridge ...
60:
61:
62: > >4. does anyone have the T-Serice part of the ISODE manual i could
63: > >borrow?
64:
65: Ok, you can borrow mine.
66:
67: > 5. Has anyone looked at non blocking T-Service - X requires this to
68: > run well (though it can run over blocking), luckily it doesnt require
69: > asynch (phew), but it does like doing writes (T-DATA-REQ's) without
70: > haning around... (the converse, polling for reads seems ok since i can
71: > use ?select i spose...)?
72:
73: Non-blocking session could be quite entertaining...
74: (Non-deadlocking session was bad enough).
75:
76:
77: Mike
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