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Annotation of 43BSDTahoe/usr.lib/learn/morefiles/L1.1a, revision 1.1

1.1     ! root        1: #print
        !             2: One of the more useful programs on Unix is "spell", which
        !             3: looks for spelling mistakes in a set of files.  Although spell
        !             4: is not perfect, it does a reasonable job of presenting you
        !             5: with a list of possibilities.  To look for mistakes in a set
        !             6: of files, you simply say
        !             7: 
        !             8:    spell filenames
        !             9: 
        !            10: and of course you can use shorthands like *, ? and [] to name
        !            11: the files.  For practice, there are some files whose names begin
        !            12: with "memo" in this directory; somewhere in one of them
        !            13: is a legitimate spelling mistake.  Use spell to find it, then
        !            14: type "answer word", where "word" is the mistake.
        !            15: Spell may also output a number of words
        !            16: that aren't mistakes; you may have to select real errors
        !            17: from the false ones.
        !            18: 
        !            19: By the way, spell takes a minute to run;
        !            20: go get a cup of coffee or something while you wait.
        !            21: #create memo1
        !            22: (This comes from a federalist paper by alexander hamilton.)
        !            23:    It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
        !            24: from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business
        !            25: of appointments, that it would contribute to the
        !            26: stability of the administration.  The consent of that body
        !            27: would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.  A
        !            28: change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion
        !            29: so violent or so general a revolution in the officers
        !            30: of the government as might be expected if he were the
        !            31: sole disposer of offices.  Where a man in any station had
        !            32: given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
        !            33: President would be restrained from attempting a change
        !            34: in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension
        !            35: that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate
        !            36: the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit
        !            37: upon himself.  Those who can best estimate the value of
        !            38: a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a
        !            39: provision which connects the official existence of public
        !            40: men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body
        !            41: which, from the greater permanency of its own composition,
        !            42: will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
        !            43: than any other member of the government.
        !            44:    To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
        !            45: article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested
        !            46: that it would serve to give the President an undue
        !            47: influence over the Senate, and in others that it would
        !            48: have an opposite tendency - a strong proof that neither
        !            49: suggestion is true.
        !            50:    To state the first in its proper form is to refute it.  It
        !            51: amounts to this:  the President would have an improper
        !            52: influence over the Senate, because the Senate would
        !            53: have the power of restraining him.  This is an absurdity in
        !            54: terms.  It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power
        !            55: of appointment would enable him much more effectually
        !            56: to establish a dangerous empire over that body than a
        !            57: mere power of nomination subject to their control.
        !            58:     Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
        !            59: "the Senate would influence the executive."  As I have
        !            60: had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness
        !            61: of the objection forbids a precise answer.  In
        !            62: what manner is this influence to be exerted?  In relation
        !            63: to what objects?  The power of influencing a person, in
        !            64: the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of
        !            65: conferring a benefit upon him.  How could the Senate
        !            66: confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing
        !            67: their right of negative upon his nominations?  If it
        !            68: be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence
        !            69: in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a
        !            70: different conduct, I answer that the instances in which the
        !            71: President could be personally interested in the result would
        !            72: be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the
        !            73: #create memo2
        !            74: compliances of the Senate.  Besides this, it is evident that
        !            75: the POWER which can originate the disposition of honors
        !            76: and emoluments is more likely to attract than to be attracted
        !            77: by the POWER which can merely obstruct their
        !            78: course.  If by influencing the President be want restraining
        !            79: him, this is precisely what must have been intended.
        !            80: And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary,
        !            81: at the same time that it would not be such as to
        !            82: destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled
        !            83: agency of that magistrate.  The right of nomination
        !            84: would produce all the good, without the ill.
        !            85:    Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of
        !            86: the officers of the proposed government with that which
        !            87: is established by the constitution of this State, a decided
        !            88: preference must be given to the former.  In that plan the
        !            89: power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the executive.
        !            90: And as there would be a necessity for submitting
        !            91: each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of
        !            92: the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
        !            93: from the mode of conducting it, would naturally
        !            94: become matters of notoriety, and the public would
        !            95: be at no loss to determine what part had been performed
        !            96: by the different actors.  The blame of a bad nomination
        !            97: would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.  The
        !            98: censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the
        !            99: door of the senate, aggravated by the consideration
        !           100: of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
        !           101: executive.  If an ill appointment should be made, the executive,
        !           102: for nominating, and the Senate, for approving,
        !           103: would participate, though in different degrees, in the
        !           104: opprobrium and disgrace.
        !           105:    The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment
        !           106: in this State.  The council of appointment consists
        !           107: of from three to five persons, of whom the governor
        !           108: is always one.  This small body, shut up in a private
        !           109: apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the
        !           110: execution of the trust committed to them.  It is known
        !           111: that the governor claims the right of nomination upon
        !           112: the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the Constitution;
        !           113: but it is not known to what extent, or in what
        !           114: manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is
        !           115: contradicted or opposed.  The censure of a bad appointment,
        !           116: on account of the uncertainty of its author and for
        !           117: want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor
        !           118: duration.  And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue
        !           119: lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost.  The
        !           120: most that the public can know is that the governor
        !           121: claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable
        !           122: number of four men can too often be managed
        !           123: without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
        !           124: #create memo3
        !           125: particular council should happen to be of an uncomplying
        !           126: character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their
        !           127: opposition by regulating the times of meeting in such a
        !           128: manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and
        !           129: that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great
        !           130: number of very improper appointments are from time to
        !           131: time made.  Whether a governor of this State avails himself
        !           132: of the ascendant, he must necessarily have in this
        !           133: delicate and important part of the administration to prefer
        !           134: to offices men who are best qualified for them; or
        !           135: whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement
        !           136: of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to
        !           137: his will and to the support of a despicable and dangerous
        !           138: system of personal influence are questions which, unfortunately
        !           139: for the community, can only be the subjects
        !           140: of speculation and conjecture.
        !           141:    Every mere council of appointment, however constituted,
        !           142: will be a conclave in which cabal and intrigue will
        !           143: have their full scope.  Their number, without an unwarrantable
        !           144: increase of expense, cannot be large enough to
        !           145: preclude a facility of combination.  And as each member
        !           146: will have his friends and connections to provide for,
        !           147: the desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous
        !           148: bartering of votes and bargaining for places.  The private
        !           149: attachments of one man might easily be satisfied, but to
        !           150: satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty
        !           151: men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments
        !           152: of the government in a few families and
        !           153: would lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy
        !           154: than any measure that could be contrived.  If, to avoid an
        !           155: accumulation of offices, there was to be a frequent change
        !           156: in the persons who were to be a frequent change
        !           157: in the persons who were to compose the council, this
        !           158: would involve the mischiefs of a mutable administration
        !           159: in their full extent.  Such a council would also be more
        !           160: liable to executive influence than the Senate, because
        !           161: they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately
        !           162: under the public inspection.  Such a council, in
        !           163: fine, as a substitute for the plan of the convention, would
        !           164: be productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication
        !           165: of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in
        !           166: the distribution of public honors, a decrease of stability
        !           167: in the administration of the government, and a diminution
        !           168: of the security against an undue influence of the
        !           169: executive.  And yet such a council has been warmly contended
        !           170: for as an essential amendment in the proposed
        !           171: Constitution.
        !           172:    I could not with propriety conclude my observations
        !           173: on the subject of appointments without taking notice of
        !           174: a scheme for which there have appeared some, though
        !           175: #create memo4
        !           176: but a few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House of
        !           177: Representatives in the power of making them.  I shall,
        !           178: however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot
        !           179: imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance of any
        !           180: considerable part of the community.  A body so fluctuating
        !           181: and at the same time so numerous can never be
        !           182: deemed proper for the exercise of that power.  Its unfitness
        !           183: will appear manifest to all when it is recollected that
        !           184: in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred
        !           185: persons.  All the advantages of the stability, both of the
        !           186: Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this
        !           187: union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be
        !           188: occasioned.  The exampled of most of the States in their
        !           189: local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the idea.
        !           190:    The only remaining powers of the executive are comprehended
        !           191: in giving information to Congress of the state
        !           192: of the Union; in recommending to their consideration
        !           193: such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening
        !           194: them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in
        !           195: adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon
        !           196: the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and
        !           197: other public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws;
        !           198: and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.
        !           199:    Except some cavils about the power of convening either
        !           200: house of the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors,
        !           201: no objection has been made to this class of
        !           202: authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any.  It required,
        !           203: indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure to invent
        !           204: exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to.  In
        !           205: regard to the power of convening either house of the legislature
        !           206: I shall barely remark that in respect to the Senate,
        !           207: at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it.  As
        !           208: this body has a concurrent power with the executive in
        !           209: the article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call
        !           210: it together with a view to this object, when it would be
        !           211: unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives.
        !           212: As to the reception of ambassadors, what I
        !           213: have said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
        !           214:    We have now completed a survy of the structure and
        !           215: powers of the executive department which, I have endeavored
        !           216: to show, combines, as far as republican principles
        !           217: will admit, all the requisites to energy.  The
        !           218: remaining inquiry is:  does it also combine the requisites
        !           219: to safety, in the republican sense - due dependence on
        !           220: the people, a due responsibility?  The answer to this question
        !           221: has been anticipated in the investigation of its other
        !           222: characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these
        !           223: circumstances; the election of the President once in four
        !           224: years by persons immediately chosen by the people for
        !           225: that purpose, and his being at all times liable to impeachment,
        !           226: trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve
        !           227: in any other, and to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent
        !           228: prosecution in the common course of law.  But
        !           229: these precautions, great as they are, are not the only
        !           230: ones which the plan of the convention has provided in
        !           231: favor of the public security.  In the only instances in which
        !           232: the abuse of the executive authority was materially to be
        !           233: feared, the chief Magistrate of the United States, would,
        !           234: by that plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of
        !           235: the legislative body.  What more can an enlightened and
        !           236: reasonable people desire?
        !           237: #copyin
        !           238: #user
        !           239: #uncopyin
        !           240: #match survy
        !           241: #log
        !           242: #next
        !           243: 1.1b 10

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