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Annotation of 43BSDTahoe/usr.lib/learn/morefiles/L4.1d, revision 1.1

1.1     ! root        1: #print
        !             2: Unix has several rather simple programs that are useful
        !             3: in their own right and as building blocks in more complicated
        !             4: operations.   One of the most frequently used is "wc",
        !             5: which counts lines, words, and characters in files.
        !             6: If you say
        !             7:   wc file
        !             8: or 
        !             9:   wc <file
        !            10: wc will print three numbers: the number of
        !            11: lines, words and characters in the file.
        !            12: (Some systems have an obsolete version of "wc" that
        !            13: doesn't count the characters.)
        !            14: If there is more than one file, as in
        !            15:   wc file1 file2 file3 file4
        !            16: then wc will list the counts for each file separately,
        !            17: and the total.
        !            18: 
        !            19: What is the total number of words
        !            20: in the two files whose names begin with "memo"?
        !            21: Type "answer N", where N is the number of words.
        !            22: #create memo1
        !            23:    It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
        !            24: from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business
        !            25: of appointments, that it would contribute to the
        !            26: stability of the administration.  The consent of that body
        !            27: would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.  A
        !            28: change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion
        !            29: so violent or so general a revolution in the officers
        !            30: of the government as might be expected if he were the
        !            31: sole disposer of offices.  Where a man in any station had
        !            32: given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
        !            33: President would be restrained from attempting a change
        !            34: in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension
        !            35: that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate
        !            36: the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit
        !            37: upon himself.  Those who can best estimate the value of
        !            38: a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a
        !            39: provision which connects the official existence of public
        !            40: men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body
        !            41: which, from the greater permanency of its own composition,
        !            42: will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
        !            43: than any other member of the government.
        !            44:    To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
        !            45: article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested
        !            46: that it would serve to give the President an undue
        !            47: influence over the Senate, and in others that it would
        !            48: have an opposite tendency - a strong proof that neither
        !            49: suggestion is true.
        !            50:    To state the first in its proper form is to refute it.  It
        !            51: amounts to this:  the President would have an improper
        !            52: influence over the Senate, because the Senate would
        !            53: have the power of restraining him.  This is an absurdity in
        !            54: terms.  It cannot admit of a doubt that the entire power
        !            55: of appointment would enable him much more effectually
        !            56: to establish a dangerous empire over that body than a
        !            57: mere power of nomination subject to their control.
        !            58:     Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
        !            59: "the Senate would influence the executive."  As I have
        !            60: had occasion to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness
        !            61: of the objection forbids a precise answer.  In
        !            62: what manner is this influence to be exerted?  In relation
        !            63: to what objects?  The power of influencing a person, in
        !            64: the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of
        !            65: conferring a benefit upon him.  How could the Senate
        !            66: confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of employing
        !            67: their right of negative upon his nominations?  If it
        !            68: be said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence
        !            69: in a favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a
        !            70: different conduct, I answer that the instances in which the
        !            71: President could be personally interested in the result would
        !            72: be too few to admit of his being materially affected by the
        !            73: #create memo2
        !            74: compliances of the Senate.  Besides this, it is evident that
        !            75: the POWER which can originate the disposition of honors
        !            76: and emoluments is more likely to attract than to be attracted
        !            77: by the POWER which can merely obstruct their
        !            78: course.  If by influencing the President be want restraining
        !            79: him, this is precisely what must have been intended.
        !            80: And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary,
        !            81: at the same time that it would not be such as to
        !            82: destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled
        !            83: agency of that magistrate.  The right of nomination
        !            84: would produce all the good, without the ill.
        !            85:    Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of
        !            86: the officers of the proposed government with that which
        !            87: is established by the constitution of this State, a decided
        !            88: preference must be given to the former.  In that plan the
        !            89: power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the executive.
        !            90: And as there would be a necessity for submitting
        !            91: each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of
        !            92: the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
        !            93: from the mode of conducting it, would naturally
        !            94: become matters of notoriety, and the public would
        !            95: be at no loss to determine what part had been performed
        !            96: by the different actors.  The blame of a bad nomination
        !            97: would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.  The
        !            98: censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the
        !            99: door of the senate, aggravated by the consideration
        !           100: of their having counteracted the good intentions of the
        !           101: executive.  If an ill appointment should be made, the executive,
        !           102: for nominating, and the Senate, for approving,
        !           103: would participate, though in different degrees, in the
        !           104: opprobrium and disgrace.
        !           105:    The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment
        !           106: in this State.  The council of appointment consists
        !           107: of from three to five persons, of whom the governor
        !           108: is always one.  This small body, shut up in a private
        !           109: apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the
        !           110: execution of the trust committed to them.  It is known
        !           111: that the governor claims the right of nomination upon
        !           112: the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the Constitution;
        !           113: but it is not known to what extent, or in what
        !           114: manner he exercises it; nor upon what occasions he is
        !           115: contradicted or opposed.  The censure of a bad appointment,
        !           116: on account of the uncertainty of its author and for
        !           117: want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor
        !           118: duration.  And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue
        !           119: lies open, all idea of responsibility is lost.  The
        !           120: most that the public can know is that the governor
        !           121: claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable
        !           122: number of four men can too often be managed
        !           123: without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
        !           124: #copyin
        !           125: #user
        !           126: #uncopyin
        !           127: #match 949
        !           128: #log
        !           129: #next
        !           130: 4.1e 10

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