--- pgp/doc/pgpdoc1.txt 2018/04/24 16:39:43 1.1.1.1 +++ pgp/doc/pgpdoc1.txt 2018/04/24 16:40:35 1.1.1.2 @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Volume I: Essential Topics -------------------------- by Philip Zimmermann - Revised 6 Mar 93 + Revised 14 Jun 93 - PGP Version 2.2 - 6 Mar 93 + PGP Version 2.3a - 1 Jul 93 Software by Philip Zimmermann with @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ labor-intensive monitoring is not practi is only done in important cases when it seems worthwhile. More and more of our private communications are being routed through -electronic channels. Electronic mail will gradually replace +electronic channels. Electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail. E-mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. @@ -164,13 +164,13 @@ scale by the NSA. We are moving toward a future when the nation will be crisscrossed with high capacity fiber optic data networks linking together all our increasingly ubiquitous personal computers. E-mail will be the norm -for everyone, not the novelty it is today. Perhaps the Government -will protect our E-mail with Government-designed encryption -protocols. Probably most people will trust that. But perhaps some -people will prefer their own protective measures. +for everyone, not the novelty it is today. The Government will +protect our E-mail with Government-designed encryption protocols. +Probably most people will trust that. But perhaps some people will +prefer their own protective measures. Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anti-crime bill, had an unsettling -measure buried in it. If this non binding resolution had become real +measure buried in it. If this non-binding resolution had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap doors" in their products, so that the Government can read anyone's encrypted messages. It reads: "It @@ -180,8 +180,30 @@ equipment shall insure that communicatio Government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law." This measure was defeated after rigorous protest from civil libertarians -and industry groups. But the Government has since introduced other -disturbing legislation to work toward similar objectives. +and industry groups. + +In 1992, the FBI Digital Telephony wiretap proposal was introduced to +Congress. It would require all manufacturers of communications +equipment to build in special remote wiretap ports that would enable +the FBI to remotely wiretap all forms of electronic communication +from FBI offices. Although it never attracted any sponsors in +Congress because of citizen opposition, it will be reintroduced in +1993. + +Most alarming of all is the White House's bold new encryption policy +initiative, under development at NSA for four years, and unveiled +April 16th, 1993. The centerpiece of this initiative is a +Government-built encryption device, called the "Clipper" chip, +containing a new classified NSA encryption algorithm. The Government +is encouraging private industry to design it into all their secure +communication products, like secure phones, secure FAX, etc. AT&T is +now putting the Clipper into all their secure voice products. The +catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be loaded +with its own unique key, and the Government gets to keep a copy, +placed in escrow. Not to worry, though-- the Government promises +that they will use these keys to read your traffic only when duly +authorized by law. Of course, to make Clipper completely effective, +the next logical step would be to outlaw other forms of cryptography. If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. Intelligence agencies have access to good cryptographic technology. So do the big @@ -319,8 +341,8 @@ friend who will then add it to her key r Installing PGP ============== -The MSDOS PGP 2.2 release comes in a compressed archive file called -PGP22.ZIP (each new release will have a name in the form "PGPxy.ZIP" +The MSDOS PGP 2.3 release comes in a compressed archive file called +PGP23.ZIP (each new release will have a name in the form "PGPxy.ZIP" for PGP version number x.y). The archive can be decompressed with the MSDOS shareware decompression utility PKUNZIP, or the Unix utility "unzip". The PGP release package contains a README.DOC file @@ -585,12 +607,18 @@ your computer. If you don't want a pass press return (or enter) at the pass phrase prompt. The public/secret key pair is derived from large truly random numbers -derived from measuring the intervals between your keystrokes with a -fast timer. - -Note that RSA key generation is a VERY lengthy process. It may take -a few seconds for a small key on a fast processor, or quite a few -minutes for a large key on an old IBM PC/XT. +derived mainly from measuring the intervals between your keystrokes +with a fast timer. The software will ask you to enter some random +text to help it accumulate some random bits for the keys. When +asked, you should provide some keystrokes that are reasonably random +in their timing, and it wouldn't hurt to make the actual characters +that you type irregular in content as well. Some of the randomness +is derived from the unpredictability of the content of what you +type. So don't just type repeated sequences of characters. + +Note that RSA key generation is a lengthy process. It may take a few +seconds for a small key on a fast processor, or quite a few minutes +for a large key on an old IBM PC/XT. The generated key pair will be placed on your public and secret key rings. You can later use the -kx command option to extract (copy) @@ -1605,7 +1633,7 @@ that I dropped in to start it all off. About the Author ================ -Philip Zimmermann is a software engineer consultant with 18 years +Philip Zimmermann is a software engineer consultant with 19 years experience, specializing in embedded real-time systems, cryptography, authentication, and data communications. Experience includes design and implementation of authentication systems for financial @@ -1622,7 +1650,5 @@ Boulder Software Engineering 3021 Eleventh Street Boulder, Colorado 80304 USA Phone 303-541-0140 (voice or FAX) (10:00am - 7:00pm Mountain Time) -Internet: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu - - +Internet: prz@acm.org