--- pgp/src/keymaint.c	2018/04/24 16:37:53	1.1
+++ pgp/src/keymaint.c	2018/04/24 16:38:35	1.1.1.2
@@ -1,1081 +1,1198 @@
-/*	keymaint.c  - Keyring maintenance pass routines for PGP.
-	PGP: Pretty Good(tm) Privacy - public key cryptography for the masses.
-
-	(c) Copyright 1990-1992 by Philip Zimmermann.  All rights reserved.
-	The author assumes no liability for damages resulting from the use
-	of this software, even if the damage results from defects in this
-	software.  No warranty is expressed or implied.
-
-	All the source code Philip Zimmermann wrote for PGP is available for
-	free under the "Copyleft" General Public License from the Free
-	Software Foundation.  A copy of that license agreement is included in
-	the source release package of PGP.  Code developed by others for PGP
-	is also freely available.  Other code that has been incorporated into
-	PGP from other sources was either originally published in the public
-	domain or was used with permission from the various authors.  See the
-	PGP User's Guide for more complete information about licensing,
-	patent restrictions on certain algorithms, trademarks, copyrights,
-	and export controls.  
-
-	keymaint.c implemented by Branko Lankester.
-*/
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include "mpilib.h"
-#include "random.h"
-#include "crypto.h"
-#include "fileio.h"
-#include "keymgmt.h"
-#include "mpiio.h"
-#include "language.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
-
-
-void setup_trust();
-int maint_pass1(FILE *f);
-int maint_trace_chain(FILE *f);
-int maint_cmpfiles(FILE *f, FILE *g);
-int trace_sig_chain(FILE *f, byte *fromID, int owner_trust, int depth);
-int check_secretkey(FILE *f, long keypos);
-int set_legit(FILE *f, long trustpos, int trust_count);
-long lookup_by_keyID(FILE *f, byte *srch_keyID);
-void show_userid(FILE *f, byte *keyID);
-int show_trust(byte, byte);
-int show_legit(byte, byte);
-void write_trust_pos(FILE *f, byte keyctrl, long pos);
-
-/* returned when trying to do a maintenance pass on a secret keyring or keyfile */
-#define	ERR_NOTRUST		-7
-
-#define TRUST_MASK		7	/* mask for userid/signature trust bytes */
-#define SET_TRUST(b,v)	(*(b) = (*(b) & ~TRUST_MASK) | (v))
-#define TRUST_LEV(b)	((b) & TRUST_MASK)
-
-#define	TRUST_FAC(x)	(trust_tbl[TRUST_LEV(x)])
-
-/*
- * table for tuning user paranoia index.
- * values represent contribution of one signature indexed by the
- * SIGTRUST of a signature
- */
-int trust_tbl[8];
-
-static int marginal_min;
-static int complete_min;	/* total count needed for a fully legit key */
-
-int marg_min = 2;		/* number of marginally trusted signatures needed for
-						   a fully legit key (can be set in config.pgp). */
-int compl_min = 1;		/* number of fully trusted signatures needed */
-
-char trust_lst[8][16] = {
-	"undefined",		/* PSTR("undefined") */
-	"unknown",			/* PSTR("unknown") */
-	"untrusted",		/* PSTR("untrusted") */
-	"<3>",				/* unused */
-	"<4>",				/* unused */
-	"marginal",			/* PSTR("marginal") */
-	"complete",			/* PSTR("complete") */
-	"ultimate",			/* PSTR("ultimate") */
-};
-
-char legit_lst[4][16] = {
-	"undefined",
-	"untrusted",
-	"marginal",
-	"complete"
-};
-
-int trustlst_len = 9;	/* length of longest trust word */
-int legitlst_len = 9;	/* length of longest legit word */
-
-char floppyring[MAX_PATH] = "";
-int max_cert_depth = 4;		/* maximum nesting of signatures */
-
-static boolean check_only = FALSE;
-static boolean mverbose;
-static FILE *sec_fp;
-static FILE *floppy_fp = NULL;
-static int undefined_trust;	/* number of legit keys with undef. trust */
-  
-int
-maintenance(char *ringfile, int options)
-{
-	FILE *f, *g;
-	int status;
-	char *tmpring;
-	char secretkeyring[MAX_PATH];
-
-	check_only = (options & MAINT_CHECK) != 0;
-	mverbose = (options & MAINT_VERBOSE) != 0;
-	undefined_trust = 0;
-
-	if ((tmpring = tempfile(TMP_TMPDIR)) == NULL)
-		return(-1);
-	if ((g = fopenbin(tmpring, "w+")) == NULL)
-		return(-1);
-
-	if ((f = fopenbin(ringfile,"r")) == NULL)
-	{	fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\n\007Can't open key ring file '%s'\n"),ringfile);
-		fclose(g);
-		return(-1);
-	}
-
-	buildfilename(secretkeyring, SECRET_KEYRING_FILENAME);
-	if ((sec_fp = fopenbin(secretkeyring, "r")) == NULL)
-		fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nCan't open secret key ring file '%s'\n"),
-				secretkeyring);
-
-	if (!(options & MAINT_SILENT) && *floppyring != '\0' &&
-		(floppy_fp = fopenbin(floppyring, "r")) == NULL)
-		fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nCan't open backup key ring file '%s'\n"),
-				floppyring);
-
-	if ((status = copyfile(f, g, -1L)) < 0)
-	{	fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\n\007Could not read key from file '%s'.\n"), ringfile);
-		goto failed;
-	}
-
-	setup_trust();
-	if (mverbose)
-		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 1: Looking for the \"ultimately-trusted\" keys...\n"));
-	rewind(g);
-	if ((status = maint_pass1(g)) < 0)
-		goto failed;
-
-	if (mverbose)
-		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 2: Tracing signature chains...\n"));
-	rewind(g);
-	if ((status = maint_trace_chain(g)) < 0)
-		goto failed;
-
-	if (!(options & MAINT_SILENT))
-	{	if (mverbose)
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 3: Comparing with original keyring...\n"));
-		rewind(f);
-		rewind(g);
-		if ((status = maint_cmpfiles(f, g)) < 0)
-			goto failed;
-	} else
-		status = 1;
-
-	fflush(g);
-	if (ferror(g))
-	{	status = -1;
-		goto failed;
-	}
-	fclose(f);
-	fclose(g);
-	if (sec_fp)
-		fclose(sec_fp);
-	if (floppy_fp)
-	{	fclose(floppy_fp);
-		floppy_fp = NULL;
-	}
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	if (check_only)
-	{
-		if (undefined_trust)
-			fprintf(pgpout, "\nKeyring contains %d fully validated key(s) with undefined trust.\n", undefined_trust);
-		else
-			if (status == 0)
-				fprintf(pgpout, "\nMaintenance check OK.\n");
-		rmtemp(tmpring);
-		return(0);
-	}
-#endif
-
-	if (status > 0)		/* keyring is changed */
-	{
-		if (options & MAINT_SILENT)
-		{	/* implicit maintenance pass (after pgp -ka, -kr, -ks) */
-			remove(ringfile);
-			if (savetemp(tmpring, ringfile) == NULL)
-				return(-1);
-		}
-		else
-		{	/* explicit maintenance pass */
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("Update public keyring '%s' (Y/n)? "), ringfile);
-			if (!getyesno('y'))
-			{
-				rmtemp(tmpring);
-				return(0);
-			}
-			if (savetempbak(tmpring, ringfile))
-				return(-1);
-		}
-	}
-	else
-		rmtemp(tmpring);
-
-	return(0);
-
-failed:
-	if (sec_fp)
-		fclose(sec_fp);
-	if (floppy_fp)
-	{	fclose(floppy_fp);
-		floppy_fp = NULL;
-	}
-	fclose(f);
-	fclose(g);
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	savetempbak(tmpring, "tmpring.pub");
-#else
-	rmtemp(tmpring);
-#endif
-	return(status);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * check if axiomatic keys are present in the secret keyring and
- * clear userid and signature trust bytes
- */
-int
-maint_pass1(FILE *f)
-{
-	int status;
-	char userid[256];
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte ctb;
-	byte keyctrl;
-	boolean buckstop = FALSE, show_user = FALSE;
-	boolean compromised = FALSE;
-	int buckstopcount = 0;
-	int usercount = 0;
-	long keypos = 0;
-
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
-	{
-		if (status < 0)
-			return(status);
-
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_COMMENT_TYPE))
-			continue;
-		if (compromised && is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE) && !usercount)
-			continue;	/* compromise certificate */
-
-		/* other packets should have trust byte */
-		if (read_trust(f, &keyctrl) < 0)
-			return(ERR_NOTRUST);		/* not a public keyring */
-
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
-		{
-			if (compromised = is_compromised(f))
-				keyctrl = KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER;
-			if ((keyctrl & KC_BUCKSTOP))
-			{
-				if (check_secretkey(f, keypos) == 0)
-				{
-					++buckstopcount;
-					buckstop = TRUE;
-					if (mverbose)
-						fprintf(pgpout, "* %s",keyIDstring(keyID));
-				}
-				else
-				{	/* not in secret keyring */
-					keyctrl &= ~KC_BUCKSTOP;
-					if (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl) == KC_OWNERTRUST_ULTIMATE)
-						keyctrl = KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS;
-					if (mverbose)
-						fprintf(pgpout, ". %s",keyIDstring(keyID));
-				}
-				show_user = mverbose;
-			}
-			else
-			{
-				buckstop = FALSE;
-				show_user = FALSE;
-			}
-			usercount = 0;
-			keyctrl &= ~KC_VISITED;
-
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{
-			if (show_user)
-			{
-				if (usercount)		/* more than one user ID */
-					fprintf(pgpout, "        ");
-				fprintf(pgpout, "  %s\n", EXTERNAL(userid));
-			}
-  			if (buckstop)
-  				keyctrl = KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE;
-  			else
-  				keyctrl = KC_LEGIT_UNKNOWN;
-			++usercount;
-		}
-		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
-		{
-			keyctrl = KC_SIGTRUST_UNDEFINED;
-		}
-		fseek(f, -1L, SEEK_CUR);
-		fwrite(&keyctrl, 1, 1, f);
-		fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_CUR);
-		keypos = ftell(f);
-	}
-	if (buckstopcount == 0 && mverbose)
-	{
-		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("No ultimately-trusted keys.\n"));
-	}
-	return(0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * scan keyring for buckstop keys and start the recursive trace_sig_chain()
- * on them
- */
-int
-maint_trace_chain(FILE *f)
-{
-	int status;
-	char userid[256];
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	long trustpos = 0;
-	byte ctb;
-	byte own_trust;
-	boolean buckstop = FALSE;
-
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
-	{
-		if (status < 0)
-			return status;
-
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
-		{
-			trustpos = ftell(f);
-			if ((status = read_trust(f, &own_trust)) < 0)
-				return(status);
-			buckstop = (own_trust & KC_BUCKSTOP) != 0;
-			userid[0] = '\0';
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{
-			if (buckstop)
-			{
-				buckstop = FALSE;	/* only for first user id */
-				if (mverbose)
-					fprintf(pgpout, "* %s\n", EXTERNAL(userid));
-
-				if (TRUST_LEV(own_trust) == KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED)
-				{	SET_TRUST(&own_trust, ask_owntrust(userid, own_trust));
-					write_trust_pos(f, own_trust, trustpos);
-				}
-				if (trace_sig_chain(f, keyID, TRUST_LEV(own_trust), 0) < 0)
-					return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return(0);
-}
-
-
-/* 
- * check if the maintenance pass changed anything
- * returns 0 if files f and g are equal.
- */
-int
-maint_cmpfiles(FILE *f, FILE *g)
-{
-	int status;
-	char userid[256];
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte ctb;
-	byte kc_orig, kc_new;
-	int usercount = 0;
-	int changed = 0;
-
-	fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  KeyID   Trust      Validity  User ID\n"));
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, sigkeyID)) == 0)
-	{
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_COMMENT_TYPE))
-			continue;
-		/* other packets should have trust byte */
-
-		fseek(g, ftell(f), SEEK_SET);
-		if (read_trust(f, &kc_orig) < 0 || read_trust(g, &kc_new) < 0)
-		{	status = ERR_NOTRUST;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
-		{
-			if (is_compromised(f))
-			{
-				fprintf(pgpout, "# ");
-				nextkeypacket(f, &ctb);	/* skip compromise certificate */
-				nextkeypacket(g, &ctb);
-			}
-			else if ((kc_new & KC_BUCKSTOP))
-				fprintf(pgpout, "* ");
-			else
-				fprintf(pgpout, "  ");
-
-			fprintf(pgpout, "%s ",keyIDstring(keyID));
-			changed += show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig);
-			usercount = 0;
-			userid[0] = '\0';
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{
-  			if (usercount)		/* more than one user ID */
-				fprintf(pgpout, "          %*s", trustlst_len, "");
-  			++usercount;
-			changed += show_legit(kc_new, kc_orig);
-			fprintf(pgpout, "%s\n", EXTERNAL(userid));
-		}
-		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
-		{
-			if (kc_new & KC_CONTIG)
-				fprintf(pgpout, "c        ");
-			else
-				fprintf(pgpout, "         ");
-			changed += show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig);
-			fprintf(pgpout, "  %*s", legitlst_len, "");
-			show_userid(f, sigkeyID);
-		}
-	}
-	if (status >= -1 && changed)
-		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n%d \"trust byte(s)\" changed.\n"), changed);
-	if (status < -1)	/* -1 is OK, EOF */
-		return(status);
-	return(changed);
-}
-
-
-void
-init_trust_lst()
-{
-	static int initialized = 0;
-	int i, len;
-	char *s;
-
-	if (initialized)
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
-	{	if (trust_lst[i][0])
-		{	s = PSTR (trust_lst[i]);
-			if (s != trust_lst[i])
-				strncpy(trust_lst[i], s, sizeof(trust_lst[0]) - 1);
-			len = strlen(s);
-			if (len > trustlst_len)
-				trustlst_len = len;
-		}
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
-	{	s = PSTR (legit_lst[i]);
-		if (s != legit_lst[i])
-			strncpy(legit_lst[i], s, sizeof(legit_lst[0]) - 1);
-		len = strlen(s);
-		if (len > legitlst_len)
-			legitlst_len = len;
-	}
-	++trustlst_len;
-	++legitlst_len;
-	initialized = 1;
-}
-
-int
-show_trust(byte kc_new, byte kc_orig)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	fprintf(pgpout, " %02x", kc_new);
-	if (kc_new != kc_orig)
-	{
-		fprintf(pgpout, " (%02x)    ", kc_orig);
-		return(1);
-	}
-	fprintf(pgpout, "        ");
-	return(0);
-#else
-	init_trust_lst();
-	fprintf(pgpout, "%c%-*s", (kc_new == kc_orig ? ' ' : '!'),
-			trustlst_len, trust_lst[TRUST_LEV(kc_new)]);
-	return(kc_new != kc_orig);
-#endif
-}
-
-int
-show_legit(byte kc_new, byte kc_orig)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	return(show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig));
-#else
-	init_trust_lst();
-	kc_new &= KC_LEGIT_MASK;
-	kc_orig &= KC_LEGIT_MASK;
-	fprintf(pgpout, "%c%-*s", (kc_new == kc_orig ? ' ' : '!'),
-			legitlst_len, legit_lst[kc_new]);
-	return(kc_new != kc_orig);
-#endif
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Find all signatures made with a key, fromID is the keyID of this key
- * owner_trust is the trust level of this key.
- * If a trusted signature makes a key fully legit then signatures made
- * with this key are also recursively traced on down the tree.
- */
-int
-trace_sig_chain(FILE *f, byte *fromID, int owner_trust, int depth)
-{
-	long filepos;
-	int status;
-	int trust_count = 0;
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte ctb;
-	byte own_trust, sig_trust;
-	char userid[256];
-	int sig_count = 0;
-	int compromised = 0;
-	long usertrustpos = 0;
-	long ownt_pos = 0;
-
-	if (max_cert_depth > 8)
-		max_cert_depth = 8;
-	if (depth > max_cert_depth)
-		return(0);
-	filepos = ftell(f);
-	rewind(f);
-	userid[0] = '\0';
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, sigkeyID)) != -1)
-	{
-		if (status < 0)
-			return status;
-
-		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
-		{
-			compromised = is_compromised(f);
-			ownt_pos = ftell(f);
-			if (read_trust(f, &own_trust))
-				return(ERR_NOTRUST);
-			userid[0] = '\0';
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{
-			usertrustpos = ftell(f);
-			trust_count = 0;
-		}
-		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
-		{
-			if (compromised)
-				continue;
-			read_trust(f, &sig_trust);
-			if (memcmp(sigkeyID, fromID, sizeof(sigkeyID)) == 0)
-			{
-				++sig_count;
-				if (mverbose)
-					fprintf(pgpout, "%*s  > %s\n", 2*depth, "", EXTERNAL(userid));
-				if (TRUST_LEV(sig_trust) != owner_trust)
-				{
-					SET_TRUST(&sig_trust, owner_trust);
-				}
-				sig_trust |= KC_CONTIG;
-				fseek(f, -1L, SEEK_CUR);
-				fwrite(&sig_trust, 1, 1, f);
-				fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_CUR);
-			}
-
-			if (sig_trust & KC_CONTIG)
-			{
-				trust_count += TRUST_FAC(sig_trust);
-
-				switch (set_legit(f, usertrustpos, trust_count))
-				{
-					case -1: return(-1);
-					case  1:
-						if ((own_trust & (KC_BUCKSTOP|KC_VISITED)) == 0)
-						{
-							if (TRUST_LEV(own_trust) == KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED)
-								SET_TRUST(&own_trust, ask_owntrust(userid, own_trust));
-							own_trust |= KC_VISITED;
-							write_trust_pos(f, own_trust, ownt_pos);
-							trace_sig_chain(f, keyID, TRUST_LEV(own_trust), depth+1);
-						}
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if (mverbose && sig_count == 0)	/* no signatures from this user */
-		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("%*s  (No signatures)\n"), 2*depth, "");
-	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
-	return(0);
-}
-
-
-int
-check_secretkey(FILE *f, long keypos)
-{
-	int status = -1;
-	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
-	unit nsec[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], esec[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
-	char userid[256];
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	long savepos, pktlen;
-	byte ctb;
-
-	if (sec_fp == NULL)
-		return(-1);
-
-	savepos = ftell(f);
-	fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
-	if (readkeypacket(f, FALSE, &ctb, NULL, NULL, n, e,
-					NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-		goto ex;
-	extract_keyID(keyID, n);
-
-	do	/* get userid */
-	{	if (readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-			goto ex;
-	} while (ctb != CTB_USERID);
-
-	if (lookup_by_keyID(sec_fp, keyID) < 0)
-	{
-#if 0
-		if (!check_only)
-		{
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR (
-"\nAn \"axiomatic\" key is one which does not need certifying by\n\
-anyone else.  Usually this special status is reserved only for your\n\
-own keys, which should also appear on your secret keyring.  The owner\n\
-of an axiomatic key (who is typically yourself) is \"ultimately trusted\"\n\
-by you to certify any or all other keys.\n"));
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR ("\nKey for user ID: \"%s\"\n\
-is designated as an \"ultimately-trusted\" introducer, but the key\n\
-does not appear in the secret keyring.\n\
-Use this key as an ultimately-trusted introducer (y/N)? "), EXTERNAL(userid));
-			status = (getyesno('n') ? 0 : 1);
-		}
-#else
-		status = 1;
-#endif
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		long kpos = ftell(sec_fp);
-		if (readkeypacket(sec_fp, FALSE, &ctb, NULL, NULL, nsec, esec,
-						NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-		{
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Cannot read from secret keyring.\n"));
-			goto ex;
-		}
-		if (mp_compare(n, nsec) || mp_compare(e, esec))
-		{	/* Red Alert! */
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007WARNING: Public key for user ID: \"%s\"\n\
-does not match the corresponding key in the secret keyring.\n"), EXTERNAL(userid));
-			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This is a serious condition, indicating possible keyring tampering.\n"));
-			status = -2;
-		}
-		else
-			status = 0;
-
-		if (floppy_fp)
-		{
-			if (lookup_by_keyID(floppy_fp, keyID) < 0)
-			{
-				fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("Public key for: \"%s\"\n\
-is not present in the backup keyring '%s'.\n"),
-						EXTERNAL(userid), floppyring);
-			}
-			else
-			{
-				pktlen = ftell(sec_fp) - kpos;
-				fseek(sec_fp, kpos, SEEK_SET);
-				while (--pktlen >= 0 && getc(sec_fp) == getc(floppy_fp)) ;
-				if (pktlen != -1)
-				{
-					fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007WARNING: Secret key for: \"%s\"\n\
-does not match the key in the backup keyring '%s'.\n"),
-							EXTERNAL(userid), floppyring);
-					fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This is a serious condition, indicating possible keyring tampering.\n"));
-					status = -2;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-ex:
-	fseek(f, savepos, SEEK_SET);
-	return(status);
-}
-
-
-void
-setup_trust()
-{	/* initialize trust table */
-	if (marg_min == 0)	/* marginally trusted signatures are ignored */
-	{
-		trust_tbl[5] = 0;
-		trust_tbl[6] = 1;
-		complete_min = compl_min;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		if (marg_min < compl_min)
-			marg_min = compl_min;
-		trust_tbl[5] = compl_min;
-		trust_tbl[6] = marg_min;
-		complete_min = compl_min * marg_min;
-	}
-	trust_tbl[7] = complete_min;	/* ultimate trust */
-	marginal_min = complete_min / 2;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * set legit level of a userid
- * returns 1 if the key/userid pair is fully legit.
- */
-int
-set_legit(FILE *f, long trustpos, int trust_count)
-{
-	long filepos;
-	byte keyctrl;
-
-	filepos = ftell(f);
-	fseek(f, trustpos, SEEK_SET);	/* user id trust byte */
-	if (read_trust(f, &keyctrl) < 0)
-		return(-1);
-	
-	if (trust_count < marginal_min)
-		keyctrl = KC_LEGIT_UNTRUSTED;
-	else if (trust_count < complete_min)
-		keyctrl = KC_LEGIT_MARGINAL;
-	else
-		keyctrl = KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE;
-	
-	fseek(f, trustpos, SEEK_SET);
-	write_trust(f, keyctrl);
-
-	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
-
-	if ((keyctrl & KC_LEGIT_MASK) == KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE)
-		return(1);
-	else
-		return(0);
-}
-
-
-int ask_owntrust(char *userid, byte cur_trust)
-/* Ask for a wetware decision from the human on how much to trust 
-this key's owner to certify other keys.  Returns trust value. */
-{
-	char buf[8];
-
-	if (check_only)
-	{	++undefined_trust;
-		return(KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED);
-	}
-
-	fprintf(pgpout, 
-PSTR("\nMake a determination in your own mind whether this key actually\n\
-belongs to the person whom you think it belongs to, based on available\n\
-evidence.  If you think it does, then based on your estimate of\n\
-that person's integrity and competence in key management, answer\n\
-the following question:\n"));  
-	fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nWould you trust \"%s\"\n\
-to act as an introducer and certify other people's public keys to you?\n\
-(1=I don't know. 2=No. 3=Usually. 4=Yes, always.) ? "), EXTERNAL(userid));
-	fflush(pgpout);
-	getstring(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, TRUE);
-	switch (buf[0])
-	{	case '1': return KC_OWNERTRUST_UNKNOWN;
-		case '2': return KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER;
-		case '3': return KC_OWNERTRUST_USUALLY;
-		case '4': return KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS;
-		default: return(TRUST_LEV(cur_trust));
-	}
-}	/* ask_owntrust */
-
-
-/* 
- * compare all key packets in keyring file f with file g
- * XXX: untested
- */
-int
-keyring_cmp(FILE *f, FILE *g)
-{
-	int status, error = 0, badkeys = 0;
-	byte ctb;
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	char userid[256];
-	long pktlen, keypos = 0;
-
-	rewind(f);
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) == 0)
-	{
-		if (is_key_ctb(ctb))
-		{
-			pktlen = ftell(f) - keypos;
-			fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
-			if (lookup_by_keyID(g, keyID) < 0)
-			{
-				error = 1;
-				continue;
-			}
-			while (--pktlen >= 0 && getc(f) == getc(g)) ;
-			if (pktlen != -1)
-			{
-				error = 2;
-				++badkeys;
-			}
-
-		}
-		if (error && ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{
-			switch (error) {
-				case 1: fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Key for user ID \"%s\"\n\
-is not present in backup keyring\n"), EXTERNAL(userid));
-				case 2: fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Key for user ID \"%s\"\n\
-does not match key in backup keyring\n"), EXTERNAL(userid));
-			}
-			error = 0;
-		}
-		keypos = ftell(f);
-	}
-	if (error)
-		status = -5;
-	return(status < 0 ? status : badkeys);
-}
-
-
-int
-readkpacket(FILE *f, byte *ctb, char *userid, byte *keyID, byte *sigkeyID)
-{
-	int status;
-	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
-
-	status = readkeypacket(f, FALSE, ctb, NULL, userid, n, e,
-					NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, sigkeyID, NULL);
-
-	if (status < 0)
-	{
-#ifdef DEBUG
-		if (status < -1)
-			fprintf(stderr, "readkeypacket returned %d\n", status);
-#endif
-		return(status);
-	}
-
-	if (keyID && is_key_ctb(*ctb))
-		extract_keyID(keyID, n);
-
-	if (userid && *ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		PascalToC(userid);
-
-	return(0);
-}
-
-long
-lookup_by_keyID(FILE *f, byte *srch_keyID)
-{
-	int status;
-	long keypos = 0;
-	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	byte ctb;
-
-	rewind(f);
-	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, NULL, keyID, NULL)) == 0)
-	{
-		if (is_key_ctb(ctb) && memcmp(keyID, srch_keyID, KEYFRAGSIZE) == 0)
-		{
-			fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
-			return(keypos);
-		}
-		keypos = ftell(f);
-	}
-	return(status);
-}
-
-
-void
-show_userid(FILE *f, byte *keyID)
-{
-	long filepos;
-	char userid[256];
-	byte ctb;
-
-	filepos = ftell(f);
-	if (lookup_by_keyID(f, keyID) >= 0)
-		while (readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, NULL, NULL) == 0)
-			if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-			{
-				fprintf(pgpout, "%s\n", EXTERNAL(userid));
-				fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
-				return;
-			}
-
-	fprintf(pgpout, "(KeyID: %s)\n",keyIDstring(keyID));
-	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
-}
-
-/*
- * show the key in file f at file position keypos.
- * 'what' controls the info that will be shown:
- *   SHOW_TRUST: show trust byte info
- *   SHOW_SIGS:  show signatures
- * these constants can be or'ed to get both
- */
-int
-show_key(FILE *f, long keypos, int what)
-{
-	int status;
-	long filepos;
-	char userid[256];
-	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
-	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
-	word32 timestamp;
-	byte ctb, keyctrl;
-	int userids = 0;
-	boolean print_trust = FALSE;
-	int precision = global_precision;
-
-	filepos = ftell(f);
-	fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
-	while ((status = readkeypacket(f, FALSE, &ctb, (byte *)&timestamp, userid,
-					n, e, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, sigkeyID, &keyctrl)) == 0)
-	{
-		if (is_key_ctb(ctb))
-		{	if (userids)
-				break;
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_KEYCTRL)  /* trust bytes only in public keyrings */
-		{
-			if (what & SHOW_TRUST)
-				print_trust = TRUE;
-		}
-		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
-		{	if (userids == 0)
-			{	PascalToC(userid);	/* for display */
-				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nKey for user ID: %s\n"),EXTERNAL(userid));
-				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("%d-bit key, Key ID %s, created %s\n"),
-					countbits(n), key2IDstring(n), cdate(&timestamp) );
-				if (print_trust)
-				{
-					switch (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl))
-					{
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED:
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_UNKNOWN:
-							/* Just don't say anything in this case */
-							break;
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER: 	/* untrusted */
-							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is untrusted to certify other keys.\n"));
-							break;
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_USUALLY: 	/* marginal trust */
-							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is generally trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
-							break;
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS: 	/* complete trust */
-							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is completely trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
-							break;
-						case KC_OWNERTRUST_ULTIMATE: 	/* axiomatic, ultimate trust */
-							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This axiomatic key is ultimately trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
-							break;
-						default:
-							break;
-					}	/* switch */
-				}
-				++userids;
-			}
-			else
-			{	PascalToC(userid);
-				if (what != 0)
-					fprintf(pgpout, "\n");
-				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("Also known as: %s\n"), EXTERNAL(userid));
-			}
-			if (print_trust)
-			{
-				read_trust(f, &keyctrl);
-				switch (keyctrl & KC_LEGIT_MASK)
-				{
-					case 0: 	/* undefined certification level */
-					case 1: 	/* uncertified */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is not certified.\n"));
-						break;
-					case 2: 	/* marginal certification */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is marginally certified.\n"));
-						break;
-					case 3: 	/* complete certification */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is fully certified.\n"));
-						break;
-					default:	/* can't get here, right? */
-						break;
-				}	/* switch */
-			}	/* print_trust */
-		}
-		else if ((what & SHOW_SIGS) && is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
-		{
-			if (print_trust)
-			{
-				read_trust(f, &keyctrl);
-				switch (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl))
-				{
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNDEFINED: 	/* undefined trust level */
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNKNOWN:
-						/* Just don't say anything in this case */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Questionable certification from:\n  "));
-						break;
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNTRUSTED: 	/* untrusted */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Untrusted certification from:\n  "));
-						break;
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_MARGINAL: 	/* marginal trust */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Generally trusted certification from:\n  "));
-						break;
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_COMPLETE: 	/* complete trust */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Completely trusted certification from:\n  "));
-						break;
-					case KC_SIGTRUST_ULTIMATE: 	/* axiomatic, ultimate trust */
-						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Axiomatically trusted certification from:\n  "));
-						break;
-					default:	/* can't get here, right? */
-						break;
-				}	/* switch */
-			}
-			else
-				fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Certified by: "));
-			show_userid(f, sigkeyID);
-		}
-	}
-	if (status == -1 && userids)
-		status = 0;
-	set_precision(precision);
-	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
-	return(status);
-}
-
-
-void
-write_trust_pos(FILE *f, byte keyctrl, long pos)
-{
-	long fpos;
-
-	fpos = ftell(f);
-	fseek(f, pos, SEEK_SET);
-	write_trust(f, keyctrl);
-	fseek(f, fpos, SEEK_SET);
-}
-
-int
-read_trust(FILE *f, byte *keyctrl)
-{
-	unsigned char buf[3];
-
-	if (fread(buf, 1, 3, f) != 3)
-		return -1;
-	if (buf[0] != CTB_KEYCTRL)
-	{
-		if (is_ctb(buf[0]))
-			return(ERR_NOTRUST);
-		 else
-			return(-3);		/* bad data */
-	}
-	if (buf[1] != 1)		/* length must be 1 */
-		return(-3);
-	if (keyctrl)
-		*keyctrl = buf[2];
-	return(0);
-}
+/*	keymaint.c  - Keyring maintenance pass routines for PGP.
+	PGP: Pretty Good(tm) Privacy - public key cryptography for the masses.
+
+	(c) Copyright 1990-1992 by Philip Zimmermann.  All rights reserved.
+	The author assumes no liability for damages resulting from the use
+	of this software, even if the damage results from defects in this
+	software.  No warranty is expressed or implied.
+
+	All the source code Philip Zimmermann wrote for PGP is available for
+	free under the "Copyleft" General Public License from the Free
+	Software Foundation.  A copy of that license agreement is included in
+	the source release package of PGP.  Code developed by others for PGP
+	is also freely available.  Other code that has been incorporated into
+	PGP from other sources was either originally published in the public
+	domain or was used with permission from the various authors.  See the
+	PGP User's Guide for more complete information about licensing,
+	patent restrictions on certain algorithms, trademarks, copyrights,
+	and export controls.  
+
+	keymaint.c implemented by Branko Lankester.
+*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "mpilib.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "keymgmt.h"
+#include "mpiio.h"
+#include "language.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+
+
+void setup_trust();
+int maint_pass1(FILE *f);
+int maint_trace_chain(FILE *f);
+int maint_cmpfiles(FILE *f, FILE *g);
+int trace_sig_chain(FILE *f, byte *fromID, int owner_trust, int depth);
+int check_secretkey(FILE *f, long keypos);
+int set_legit(FILE *f, long trustpos, int trust_count);
+long lookup_by_keyID(FILE *f, byte *srch_keyID);
+void show_userid(FILE *f, byte *keyID);
+int show_trust(byte, byte);
+int show_legit(byte, byte);
+void write_trust_pos(FILE *f, byte keyctrl, long pos);
+
+/* returned when trying to do a maintenance pass on a secret keyring or keyfile */
+#define	ERR_NOTRUST		-7
+
+#define TRUST_MASK		7	/* mask for userid/signature trust bytes */
+#define SET_TRUST(b,v)	(*(b) = (*(b) & ~TRUST_MASK) | (v))
+#define TRUST_LEV(b)	((b) & TRUST_MASK)
+
+#define	TRUST_FAC(x)	(trust_tbl[TRUST_LEV(x)])
+
+/*
+ * table for tuning user paranoia index.
+ * values represent contribution of one signature indexed by the
+ * SIGTRUST of a signature
+ */
+int trust_tbl[8];
+
+static int marginal_min;
+static int complete_min;	/* total count needed for a fully legit key */
+
+int marg_min = 2;		/* number of marginally trusted signatures needed for
+						   a fully legit key (can be set in config.pgp). */
+int compl_min = 1;		/* number of fully trusted signatures needed */
+
+char trust_lst[8][16] = {
+	"undefined",		/* PSTR("undefined") */
+	"unknown",			/* PSTR("unknown") */
+	"untrusted",		/* PSTR("untrusted") */
+	"<3>",				/* unused */
+	"<4>",				/* unused */
+	"marginal",			/* PSTR("marginal") */
+	"complete",			/* PSTR("complete") */
+	"ultimate",			/* PSTR("ultimate") */
+};
+
+char legit_lst[4][16] = {
+	"undefined",
+	"untrusted",
+	"marginal",
+	"complete"
+};
+
+int trustlst_len = 9;	/* length of longest trust word */
+int legitlst_len = 9;	/* length of longest legit word */
+
+char floppyring[MAX_PATH] = "";
+int max_cert_depth = 4;		/* maximum nesting of signatures */
+
+static boolean check_only = FALSE;
+static boolean mverbose;
+static FILE *sec_fp;
+static FILE *floppy_fp = NULL;
+static int undefined_trust;	/* number of legit keys with undef. trust */
+
+/*
+ * do a maintenance pass on keyring "ringfile"
+ * options can be:
+ *	MAINT_CHECK		check keyring only, "ringfile" will not be changed
+ *	MAINT_SILENT	used for implicit maintenance pass, does not print keyring contents
+ *	MAINT_VERBOSE	verbose output, shows signature chains
+ */
+int
+maintenance(char *ringfile, int options)
+{
+	FILE *f, *g;
+	int status;
+	char *tmpring;
+	char secretkeyring[MAX_PATH];
+	extern boolean moreflag;
+
+	check_only = (options & MAINT_CHECK) != 0;
+	mverbose = (options & MAINT_VERBOSE) != 0;
+	undefined_trust = 0;
+	if (max_cert_depth > 8)
+		max_cert_depth = 8;
+
+	if ((tmpring = tempfile(TMP_TMPDIR)) == NULL)
+		return(-1);
+	if ((g = fopen(tmpring, FOPWPBIN)) == NULL)
+		return(-1);
+
+	if ((f = fopen(ringfile,FOPRBIN)) == NULL)
+	{	fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\n\007Can't open key ring file '%s'\n"),ringfile);
+		fclose(g);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	buildfilename(secretkeyring, SECRET_KEYRING_FILENAME);
+	if ((sec_fp = fopen(secretkeyring, FOPRBIN)) == NULL)
+		fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nCan't open secret key ring file '%s'\n"),
+				secretkeyring);
+
+	if (!(options & MAINT_SILENT) && *floppyring != '\0' &&
+		(floppy_fp = fopen(floppyring, FOPRBIN)) == NULL)
+		fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nCan't open backup key ring file '%s'\n"),
+				floppyring);
+
+	if ((status = copyfile(f, g, -1L)) < 0)
+	{	fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\n\007Could not read key from file '%s'.\n"), ringfile);
+		goto failed;
+	}
+  
+	if (moreflag && !(options & MAINT_SILENT))
+		open_more();
+
+	setup_trust();
+	if (mverbose)
+		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 1: Looking for the \"ultimately-trusted\" keys...\n"));
+	rewind(g);
+	if ((status = maint_pass1(g)) < 0)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (mverbose)
+		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 2: Tracing signature chains...\n"));
+	rewind(g);
+	if ((status = maint_trace_chain(g)) < 0)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (!(options & MAINT_SILENT))
+	{	if (mverbose)
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nPass 3: Comparing with original keyring...\n"));
+		rewind(f);
+		rewind(g);
+		if ((status = maint_cmpfiles(f, g)) < 0)
+			goto failed;
+	} else
+		status = 1;
+
+	close_more();
+	if (write_error(g))
+	{	status = -1;
+		goto failed;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	fclose(g);
+	if (sec_fp)
+		fclose(sec_fp);
+	if (floppy_fp)
+	{	fclose(floppy_fp);
+		floppy_fp = NULL;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (check_only)
+	{
+		if (undefined_trust)
+			fprintf(pgpout, "\nKeyring contains %d fully validated key(s) with undefined trust.\n", undefined_trust);
+		else
+			if (status == 0)
+				fprintf(pgpout, "\nMaintenance check OK.\n");
+		rmtemp(tmpring);
+		return(0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (status > 0)		/* keyring is changed */
+	{
+		if (options & MAINT_SILENT)
+		{	/* implicit maintenance pass (after pgp -ka, -kr, -ks) */
+			remove(ringfile);
+			if (savetemp(tmpring, ringfile) == NULL)
+				return(-1);
+		}
+		else
+		{	/* explicit maintenance pass */
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("Update public keyring '%s' (Y/n)? "), ringfile);
+			if (!getyesno('y'))
+			{
+				rmtemp(tmpring);
+				return(0);
+			}
+			if (savetempbak(tmpring, ringfile))
+				return(-1);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+		rmtemp(tmpring);
+
+	return(0);
+
+failed:
+	close_more();
+	if (sec_fp)
+		fclose(sec_fp);
+	if (floppy_fp)
+	{	fclose(floppy_fp);
+		floppy_fp = NULL;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	fclose(g);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	savetempbak(tmpring, "tmpring.pub");
+#else
+	rmtemp(tmpring);
+#endif
+	return(status);
+}	/* maintenance */
+
+
+/*
+ * check if axiomatic keys are present in the secret keyring and
+ * clear userid and signature trust bytes
+ */
+int
+maint_pass1(FILE *f)
+{
+	int status;
+	char userid[256];
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte ctb;
+	byte keyctrl;
+	boolean buckstop = FALSE, show_user = FALSE;
+	boolean compromised = FALSE;
+	int buckstopcount = 0;
+	int usercount = 0;
+	long keypos = 0;
+
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			return(status);
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_COMMENT_TYPE) || ctb == CTB_KEYCTRL)
+			continue;
+		if (compromised && is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE) && !usercount)
+			continue;	/* compromise certificate */
+
+		/* other packets should have trust byte */
+		if (read_trust(f, &keyctrl) < 0)
+			return(ERR_NOTRUST);		/* not a public keyring */
+
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
+		{
+			if (compromised = is_compromised(f))
+				keyctrl = KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER;
+			if ((keyctrl & KC_BUCKSTOP))
+			{
+				if (check_secretkey(f, keypos) == 0)
+				{
+					++buckstopcount;
+					buckstop = TRUE;
+					if (mverbose)
+						fprintf(pgpout, "* %s",keyIDstring(keyID));
+				}
+				else
+				{	/* not in secret keyring */
+					keyctrl &= ~KC_BUCKSTOP;
+					if (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl) == KC_OWNERTRUST_ULTIMATE)
+						keyctrl = KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS;
+					if (mverbose)
+						fprintf(pgpout, ". %s",keyIDstring(keyID));
+				}
+				show_user = mverbose;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				buckstop = FALSE;
+				show_user = FALSE;
+			}
+			usercount = 0;
+			keyctrl &= ~KC_VISITED;
+
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{
+			if (show_user)
+			{
+				if (usercount)		/* more than one user ID */
+					fprintf(pgpout, "        ");
+				fprintf(pgpout, "  %s\n", LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+			}
+			keyctrl &= ~KC_LEGIT_MASK;
+  			if (buckstop)
+  				keyctrl |= KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE;
+  			else
+  				keyctrl |= KC_LEGIT_UNKNOWN;
+			++usercount;
+		}
+		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
+		{
+			keyctrl = KC_SIGTRUST_UNDEFINED;
+		}
+		fseek(f, -1L, SEEK_CUR);
+		fwrite(&keyctrl, 1, 1, f);
+		fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_CUR);
+		keypos = ftell(f);
+	}
+	if (buckstopcount == 0 && mverbose)
+	{
+		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("No ultimately-trusted keys.\n"));
+	}
+	return(0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * scan keyring for buckstop keys and start the recursive trace_sig_chain()
+ * on them
+ */
+int
+maint_trace_chain(FILE *f)
+{
+	int status;
+	char userid[256];
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	long trustpos = 0;
+	byte ctb;
+	byte own_trust;
+	boolean buckstop = FALSE;
+
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			return(status);
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
+		{
+			trustpos = ftell(f);
+			if ((status = read_trust(f, &own_trust)) < 0)
+				return(status);
+			buckstop = (own_trust & KC_BUCKSTOP) != 0;
+			userid[0] = '\0';
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{
+			if (buckstop)
+			{
+				buckstop = FALSE;	/* only for first user id */
+				if (mverbose)
+					fprintf(pgpout, "* %s\n", LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+
+				if (TRUST_LEV(own_trust) == KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED)
+				{	SET_TRUST(&own_trust, ask_owntrust(userid, own_trust));
+					write_trust_pos(f, own_trust, trustpos);
+				}
+				if (trace_sig_chain(f, keyID, TRUST_LEV(own_trust), 0) < 0)
+					return(-1);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return(0);
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * check if the maintenance pass changed anything
+ * returns 0 if files f and g are equal and the number of changed
+ * trust bytes if the files are different or a negative value on error
+ */
+int
+maint_cmpfiles(FILE *f, FILE *g)
+{
+	int status;
+	char userid[256];
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte ctb;
+	byte kc_orig, kc_new;
+	int usercount = 0;
+	int changed = 0;
+
+	fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  KeyID   Trust      Validity  User ID\n"));
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, sigkeyID)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			break;
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_COMMENT_TYPE))
+			continue;
+		 /* unexpected trust packet, probably after version error */
+		if (ctb == CTB_KEYCTRL)
+			continue;
+
+		/* other packets should have trust byte */
+		fseek(g, ftell(f), SEEK_SET);
+		if (read_trust(f, &kc_orig) < 0 || read_trust(g, &kc_new) < 0)
+		{	status = ERR_NOTRUST;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
+		{
+			if (is_compromised(f))
+			{
+				fprintf(pgpout, "# ");
+				nextkeypacket(f, &ctb);	/* skip compromise certificate */
+				nextkeypacket(g, &ctb);
+			}
+			else if ((kc_new & KC_BUCKSTOP))
+				fprintf(pgpout, "* ");
+			else
+				fprintf(pgpout, "  ");
+
+			fprintf(pgpout, "%s ",keyIDstring(keyID));
+			changed += show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig);
+			usercount = 0;
+			userid[0] = '\0';
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{
+  			if (usercount)		/* more than one user ID */
+				fprintf(pgpout, "         %*s ", trustlst_len, "");
+  			++usercount;
+			changed += show_legit(kc_new, kc_orig);
+			fprintf(pgpout, "%s\n", LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+		}
+		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
+		{
+			if (kc_new & KC_CONTIG)
+				fprintf(pgpout, "c        ");
+			else
+				fprintf(pgpout, "         ");
+			changed += show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig);
+			fprintf(pgpout, "%*s   ", legitlst_len, "");
+			show_userid(f, sigkeyID);
+		}
+	}
+	if (status >= -1 && changed)
+		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n%d \"trust parameter(s)\" changed.\n"), changed);
+	if (status < -1)	/* -1 is OK, EOF */
+		return(status);
+	return(changed);
+}	/* maint_cmpfiles */
+
+
+/*
+ * translate the messages in the arrays trust_lst and legit_lst.
+ * trustlst_len and legitlst_len will be set to the length of
+ * the longest translated string.
+ */
+void
+init_trust_lst()
+{
+	static int initialized = 0;
+	int i, len;
+	char *s;
+
+	if (initialized)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+	{	if (trust_lst[i][0])
+		{	s = PSTR (trust_lst[i]);
+			if (s != trust_lst[i])
+				strncpy(trust_lst[i], s, sizeof(trust_lst[0]) - 1);
+			len = strlen(s);
+			if (len > trustlst_len)
+				trustlst_len = len;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
+	{	s = PSTR (legit_lst[i]);
+		if (s != legit_lst[i])
+			strncpy(legit_lst[i], s, sizeof(legit_lst[0]) - 1);
+		len = strlen(s);
+		if (len > legitlst_len)
+			legitlst_len = len;
+	}
+	++trustlst_len;
+	++legitlst_len;
+	initialized = 1;
+}	/* init_trust_lst */
+
+/*
+ * show the trust level of trust byte kc_new.  If it is
+ * different from the old level (kc_orig) the print a '!' before
+ * the level string
+ */
+int
+show_trust(byte kc_new, byte kc_orig)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(pgpout, " %02x", kc_new);
+	if (kc_new != kc_orig)
+	{
+		fprintf(pgpout, " (%02x)    ", kc_orig);
+		return(1);
+	}
+	fprintf(pgpout, "        ");
+	return(0);
+#else
+	init_trust_lst();
+	fprintf(pgpout, "%c%-*s", (kc_new == kc_orig ? ' ' : '!'),
+			trustlst_len, trust_lst[TRUST_LEV(kc_new)]);
+	return(kc_new != kc_orig);
+#endif
+}	/* show_trust */
+
+/*
+ * show_legit is the same as show_trust, only it uses legit_lst
+ * for messages
+ */
+int
+show_legit(byte kc_new, byte kc_orig)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	return(show_trust(kc_new, kc_orig));
+#else
+	init_trust_lst();
+	kc_new &= KC_LEGIT_MASK;
+	kc_orig &= KC_LEGIT_MASK;
+	fprintf(pgpout, "%c%-*s", (kc_new == kc_orig ? ' ' : '!'),
+			legitlst_len, legit_lst[kc_new]);
+	return(kc_new != kc_orig);
+#endif
+}	/* show_legit */
+
+
+/*
+ * Find all signatures made with a key, fromID is the keyID of this key
+ * owner_trust is the trust level of this key.
+ * If a trusted signature makes a key fully legit then signatures made
+ * with this key are also recursively traced on down the tree.
+ *
+ * The file f is the public keyring, it must be open for update.
+ * depth is the level of recursion, it is used to indent the userIDs
+ * and to check if we don't exceed the limit "max_cert_depth"
+ *
+ * fromID should be the keyID of a fully validated key.
+ */
+int
+trace_sig_chain(FILE *f, byte *fromID, int owner_trust, int depth)
+{
+	long filepos;
+	int status;
+	int trust_count = 0;
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte ctb;
+	byte own_trust, sig_trust;
+	char userid[256];
+	int sig_count = 0;
+	int compromised = 0;
+	long usertrustpos = 0;
+	long ownt_pos = 0;
+	boolean fromsig = FALSE;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (mverbose)
+		fprintf(pgpout, "%*s--- %s\n", 2*depth, "", keyIDstring(fromID));
+#endif
+	filepos = ftell(f);
+	rewind(f);
+	userid[0] = '\0';
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, sigkeyID)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			return(status);
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_CERT_PUBKEY_TYPE))
+		{
+			compromised = is_compromised(f);
+			ownt_pos = ftell(f);
+			if (read_trust(f, &own_trust))
+				return(ERR_NOTRUST);
+			userid[0] = '\0';
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{
+			usertrustpos = ftell(f);
+			trust_count = 0;
+			fromsig = FALSE;
+		}
+		else if (is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
+		{	/* signature packet */
+			if (compromised)
+				continue;
+			read_trust(f, &sig_trust);
+			/* we're looking for signatures made by "fromID" */
+			if (memcmp(sigkeyID, fromID, sizeof(sigkeyID)) == 0)
+			{
+				++sig_count;
+				if (mverbose)
+					fprintf(pgpout, "%*s  > %s\n", 2*depth, "", 
+						LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+				if (TRUST_LEV(sig_trust) != owner_trust)
+				{
+					SET_TRUST(&sig_trust, owner_trust);
+				}
+				sig_trust |= KC_CONTIG;
+				fseek(f, -1L, SEEK_CUR);
+				fwrite(&sig_trust, 1, 1, f);
+				fseek(f, 0L, SEEK_CUR);
+				fromsig = TRUE;
+			}
+
+			if (sig_trust & KC_CONTIG)
+			{
+				trust_count += TRUST_FAC(sig_trust);
+
+				if (fromsig)	/* fromID has signed this key */
+				{
+					switch (set_legit(f, usertrustpos, trust_count))
+					{
+					case -1: return(-1);
+					case  1:	/* this signature made the key fully valid */
+						if ((own_trust & (KC_BUCKSTOP|KC_VISITED)) == 0)
+						{
+							if (TRUST_LEV(own_trust) == KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED)
+								SET_TRUST(&own_trust, ask_owntrust(userid, own_trust));
+							if (depth < max_cert_depth)
+								own_trust |= KC_VISITED;
+							write_trust_pos(f, own_trust, ownt_pos);
+							if (depth < max_cert_depth)
+								trace_sig_chain(f, keyID, TRUST_LEV(own_trust), depth+1);
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (mverbose && sig_count == 0)	/* no signatures from this user */
+		fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("%*s  (No signatures)\n"), 2*depth, "");
+	if (mverbose)
+		fprintf(pgpout, "%*s--- %s\n", 2*depth, "", keyIDstring(fromID));
+#endif
+	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
+	return(0);
+}	/* trace_sig_chain */
+
+
+/*
+ * compare the key in file f at keypos with the matching key in the
+ * secret keyring, the global variable sec_fp must contain the file pointer
+ * for of the secret keyring.
+ *
+ * returns 1 if the key was not found, -2 if the keys were different
+ * and 0 if the keys compared OK
+ */
+int
+check_secretkey(FILE *f, long keypos)
+{
+	int status = -1;
+	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
+	unit nsec[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], esec[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
+	char userid[256];
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	long savepos, pktlen;
+	byte ctb;
+
+	if (sec_fp == NULL)
+		return(-1);
+
+	savepos = ftell(f);
+	fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
+	if (readkeypacket(f, FALSE, &ctb, NULL, NULL, n, e,
+					NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0)
+		goto ex;
+	extract_keyID(keyID, n);
+
+	do	/* get userid */
+	{	status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, NULL, NULL);
+		if (status == -1 || status == -3)
+			goto ex;
+	} while (ctb != CTB_USERID);
+
+	if (lookup_by_keyID(sec_fp, keyID) < 0)
+	{
+#if 0
+		if (!check_only)
+		{
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR (
+"\nAn \"axiomatic\" key is one which does not need certifying by\n\
+anyone else.  Usually this special status is reserved only for your\n\
+own keys, which should also appear on your secret keyring.  The owner\n\
+of an axiomatic key (who is typically yourself) is \"ultimately trusted\"\n\
+by you to certify any or all other keys.\n"));
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR ("\nKey for user ID: \"%s\"\n\
+is designated as an \"ultimately-trusted\" introducer, but the key\n\
+does not appear in the secret keyring.\n\
+Use this key as an ultimately-trusted introducer (y/N)? "), 
+				LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+			status = (getyesno('n') ? 0 : 1);
+		}
+#else
+		status = 1;
+#endif
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		long kpos = ftell(sec_fp);
+		if (readkeypacket(sec_fp, FALSE, &ctb, NULL, NULL, nsec, esec,
+						NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0)
+		{
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Cannot read from secret keyring.\n"));
+			status = -3;
+			goto ex;
+		}
+		if (mp_compare(n, nsec) || mp_compare(e, esec))
+		{	/* Red Alert! */
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007WARNING: Public key for user ID: \"%s\"\n\
+does not match the corresponding key in the secret keyring.\n"), 
+				LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+			fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This is a serious condition, indicating possible keyring tampering.\n"));
+			status = -2;
+		}
+		else
+			status = 0;
+
+		if (floppy_fp)
+		{
+			if (lookup_by_keyID(floppy_fp, keyID) < 0)
+			{
+				fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("Public key for: \"%s\"\n\
+is not present in the backup keyring '%s'.\n"),
+					LOCAL_CHARSET(userid), floppyring);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pktlen = ftell(sec_fp) - kpos;
+				fseek(sec_fp, kpos, SEEK_SET);
+				while (--pktlen >= 0 && getc(sec_fp) == getc(floppy_fp)) ;
+				if (pktlen != -1)
+				{
+					fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007WARNING: Secret key for: \"%s\"\n\
+does not match the key in the backup keyring '%s'.\n"),
+						LOCAL_CHARSET(userid), floppyring);
+					fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This is a serious condition, indicating possible keyring tampering.\n"));
+					status = -2;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+ex:
+	fseek(f, savepos, SEEK_SET);
+	return(status);
+}	/* check_secretkey */
+
+
+/*
+ * setup tables for trust scoring.
+ */
+void
+setup_trust()
+{	/* initialize trust table */
+	if (marg_min == 0)	/* marginally trusted signatures are ignored */
+	{
+		trust_tbl[5] = 0;
+		trust_tbl[6] = 1;
+		complete_min = compl_min;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (marg_min < compl_min)
+			marg_min = compl_min;
+		trust_tbl[5] = compl_min;
+		trust_tbl[6] = marg_min;
+		complete_min = compl_min * marg_min;
+	}
+	trust_tbl[7] = complete_min;	/* ultimate trust */
+	marginal_min = complete_min / 2;
+}	/* setup_trust */
+
+
+/*
+ * set valid level of a userid, computed from trust_count.
+ * returns 1 if the key/userid pair is fully legit.
+ */
+int
+set_legit(FILE *f, long trustpos, int trust_count)
+{
+	long filepos;
+	byte keyctrl;
+
+	filepos = ftell(f);
+	fseek(f, trustpos, SEEK_SET);	/* user id trust byte */
+	if (read_trust(f, &keyctrl) < 0)
+		return(-1);
+	
+	keyctrl &= ~KC_LEGIT_MASK;
+	if (trust_count < marginal_min)
+		keyctrl |= KC_LEGIT_UNTRUSTED;
+	else if (trust_count < complete_min)
+		keyctrl |= KC_LEGIT_MARGINAL;
+	else
+		keyctrl |= KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE;
+	
+	fseek(f, trustpos, SEEK_SET);
+	write_trust(f, keyctrl);
+
+	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
+
+	if ((keyctrl & KC_LEGIT_MASK) == KC_LEGIT_COMPLETE)
+		return(1);
+	else
+		return(0);
+}	/* set_legit */
+
+
+int ask_owntrust(char *userid, byte cur_trust)
+/* Ask for a wetware decision from the human on how much to trust 
+this key's owner to certify other keys.  Returns trust value. */
+{
+	char buf[8];
+
+	if (check_only)
+	{	++undefined_trust;
+		return(KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED);
+	}
+
+	fprintf(pgpout, 
+PSTR("\nMake a determination in your own mind whether this key actually\n\
+belongs to the person whom you think it belongs to, based on available\n\
+evidence.  If you think it does, then based on your estimate of\n\
+that person's integrity and competence in key management, answer\n\
+the following question:\n"));  
+	fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\nWould you trust \"%s\"\n\
+to act as an introducer and certify other people's public keys to you?\n\
+(1=I don't know. 2=No. 3=Usually. 4=Yes, always.) ? "), 
+		LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+	fflush(pgpout);
+	getstring(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, TRUE);
+	switch (buf[0])
+	{	case '1': return KC_OWNERTRUST_UNKNOWN;
+		case '2': return KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER;
+		case '3': return KC_OWNERTRUST_USUALLY;
+		case '4': return KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS;
+		default: return(TRUST_LEV(cur_trust));
+	}
+}	/* ask_owntrust */
+
+
+/* 
+ * compare all key packets in keyring file f with file g
+ * XXX: untested
+ */
+int
+keyring_cmp(FILE *f, FILE *g)
+{
+	int status, error = 0, badkeys = 0;
+	byte ctb;
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	char userid[256];
+	long pktlen, keypos = 0;
+
+	rewind(f);
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			return(status);
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (is_key_ctb(ctb))
+		{
+			pktlen = ftell(f) - keypos;
+			fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
+			if (lookup_by_keyID(g, keyID) < 0)
+			{
+				error = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+			while (--pktlen >= 0 && getc(f) == getc(g)) ;
+			if (pktlen != -1)
+			{
+				error = 2;
+				++badkeys;
+			}
+
+		}
+		if (error && ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{
+			switch (error) {
+				case 1: fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Key for user ID \"%s\"\n\
+is not present in backup keyring\n"), LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+				case 2: fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("\n\007Key for user ID \"%s\"\n\
+does not match key in backup keyring\n"), LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+			}
+			error = 0;
+		}
+		keypos = ftell(f);
+	}
+	if (error)
+		status = -5;
+	return(status < 0 ? status : badkeys);
+}	/* keyring_cmp */
+
+
+/*
+ * stripped down version of readkeypacket(), the output userid
+ * is a null terminated string.
+ */
+int
+readkpacket(FILE *f, byte *ctb, char *userid, byte *keyID, byte *sigkeyID)
+{
+	int status;
+	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
+
+	status = readkeypacket(f, FALSE, ctb, NULL, userid, n, e,
+					NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, sigkeyID, NULL);
+
+	if (status < 0)
+	{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		if (status < -1)
+			fprintf(stderr, "readkeypacket returned %d\n", status);
+#endif
+		return(status);
+	}
+
+	if (keyID && is_key_ctb(*ctb))
+		extract_keyID(keyID, n);
+
+	if (userid && *ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		PascalToC(userid);
+
+	return(0);
+}	/* readkpacket */
+
+
+/*
+ * scan keyfile f for keyID srch_keyID.
+ * returns the file position of the key if it is found, and sets the
+ * file pointer to the start of the key packet.
+ * returns -1 if the key was not found or < -1 if there was an error
+ */
+long
+lookup_by_keyID(FILE *f, byte *srch_keyID)
+{
+	int status;
+	long keypos = 0;
+	byte keyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	byte ctb;
+
+	rewind(f);
+	while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, NULL, keyID, NULL)) != -1)
+	{
+		if (status == -3)
+			break;
+		if (status < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (is_key_ctb(ctb) && memcmp(keyID, srch_keyID, KEYFRAGSIZE) == 0)
+		{
+			fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
+			return(keypos);
+		}
+		keypos = ftell(f);
+	}
+	return(status);
+}	/* lookup_by_keyID */
+
+
+/*
+ * look up the key matching "keyID" and print the first userID
+ * of this key.  File position of f is saved.
+ */
+void
+show_userid(FILE *f, byte *keyID)
+{
+	int status;
+	long filepos;
+	char userid[256];
+	byte ctb;
+
+	filepos = ftell(f);
+	if (lookup_by_keyID(f, keyID) >= 0)
+		while ((status = readkpacket(f, &ctb, userid, NULL, NULL)) != -1 && status != -3)
+			if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+			{
+				fprintf(pgpout, "%s\n", LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+				fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
+				return;
+			}
+
+	fprintf(pgpout, "(KeyID: %s)\n",keyIDstring(keyID));
+	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
+}	/* show_userid */
+
+/*
+ * show the key in file f at file position keypos.
+ * 'what' controls the info that will be shown:
+ *   SHOW_TRUST: show trust byte info
+ *   SHOW_SIGS:  show signatures
+ * these constants can be or'ed to get both
+ */
+int
+show_key(FILE *f, long keypos, int what)
+{
+	int status;
+	long filepos;
+	char userid[256];
+	unit n[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION], e[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
+	byte sigkeyID[KEYFRAGSIZE];
+	word32 timestamp;
+	byte ctb, keyctrl;
+	int userids = 0;
+	boolean print_trust = FALSE;
+	int precision = global_precision;
+
+	filepos = ftell(f);
+	fseek(f, keypos, SEEK_SET);
+	while ((status = readkeypacket(f, FALSE, &ctb, (byte *)&timestamp, userid,
+					n, e, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, sigkeyID, &keyctrl)) == 0)
+	{
+		if (is_key_ctb(ctb))
+		{	if (userids)
+				break;
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_KEYCTRL)  /* trust bytes only in public keyrings */
+		{
+			if (what & SHOW_TRUST)
+				print_trust = TRUE;
+		}
+		else if (ctb == CTB_USERID)
+		{	if (userids == 0)
+			{	PascalToC(userid);	/* for display */
+				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("\nKey for user ID: %s\n"),
+					LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("%d-bit key, Key ID %s, created %s\n"),
+					countbits(n), key2IDstring(n), cdate(&timestamp) );
+				if (print_trust)
+				{
+					switch (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl))
+					{
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_UNDEFINED:
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_UNKNOWN:
+							/* Just don't say anything in this case */
+							break;
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_NEVER: 	/* untrusted */
+							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is untrusted to certify other keys.\n"));
+							break;
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_USUALLY: 	/* marginal trust */
+							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is generally trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
+							break;
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_ALWAYS: 	/* complete trust */
+							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This user is completely trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
+							break;
+						case KC_OWNERTRUST_ULTIMATE: 	/* axiomatic, ultimate trust */
+							fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This axiomatic key is ultimately trusted to certify other keys.\n"));
+							break;
+						default:
+							break;
+					}	/* switch */
+				}
+				++userids;
+			}
+			else
+			{	PascalToC(userid);
+				if (what != 0)
+					fprintf(pgpout, "\n");
+				fprintf(pgpout,PSTR("Also known as: %s\n"), 
+					LOCAL_CHARSET(userid));
+			}
+			if (print_trust)
+			{
+				read_trust(f, &keyctrl);
+				switch (keyctrl & KC_LEGIT_MASK)
+				{
+					case 0: 	/* undefined certification level */
+					case 1: 	/* uncertified */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is not certified.\n"));
+						break;
+					case 2: 	/* marginal certification */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is marginally certified.\n"));
+						break;
+					case 3: 	/* complete certification */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("This key/userID association is fully certified.\n"));
+						break;
+					default:	/* can't get here, right? */
+						break;
+				}	/* switch */
+			}	/* print_trust */
+		}
+		else if ((what & SHOW_SIGS) && is_ctb_type(ctb, CTB_SKE_TYPE))
+		{
+			if (print_trust)
+			{
+				read_trust(f, &keyctrl);
+				switch (TRUST_LEV(keyctrl))
+				{
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNDEFINED: 	/* undefined trust level */
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNKNOWN:
+						/* Just don't say anything in this case */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Questionable certification from:\n  "));
+						break;
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_UNTRUSTED: 	/* untrusted */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Untrusted certification from:\n  "));
+						break;
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_MARGINAL: 	/* marginal trust */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Generally trusted certification from:\n  "));
+						break;
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_COMPLETE: 	/* complete trust */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Completely trusted certification from:\n  "));
+						break;
+					case KC_SIGTRUST_ULTIMATE: 	/* axiomatic, ultimate trust */
+						fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Axiomatically trusted certification from:\n  "));
+						break;
+					default:	/* can't get here, right? */
+						break;
+				}	/* switch */
+			}
+			else
+				fprintf(pgpout, PSTR("  Certified by: "));
+			show_userid(f, sigkeyID);
+		}
+	}
+	if (status == -1 && userids)
+		status = 0;
+	set_precision(precision);
+	fseek(f, filepos, SEEK_SET);
+	return(status);
+}	/* show_key */
+
+
+/*
+ * write trust byte "keyctrl" to file f at file position "pos"
+ */
+void
+write_trust_pos(FILE *f, byte keyctrl, long pos)
+{
+	long fpos;
+
+	fpos = ftell(f);
+	fseek(f, pos, SEEK_SET);
+	write_trust(f, keyctrl);
+	fseek(f, fpos, SEEK_SET);
+}	/* write_trust_pos */
+
+
+/*
+ * read a trust byte packet from file f, the trust byte will be
+ * stored in "keyctrl".
+ * returns -1 on EOF, -3 on corrupt input, and ERR_NOTRUST if
+ * the packet was not a trust byte (this can be used to check if
+ * a file is a keyring (with trust bytes) or a keyfile).
+ */
+int
+read_trust(FILE *f, byte *keyctrl)
+{
+	unsigned char buf[3];
+
+	if (fread(buf, 1, 3, f) != 3)
+		return -1;
+	if (buf[0] != CTB_KEYCTRL)
+	{
+		if (is_ctb(buf[0]))
+			return(ERR_NOTRUST);
+		 else
+			return(-3);		/* bad data */
+	}
+	if (buf[1] != 1)		/* length must be 1 */
+		return(-3);
+	if (keyctrl)
+		*keyctrl = buf[2];
+	return(0);
+}	/* read_trust */