--- pgp/src/random.c	2018/04/24 16:38:27	1.1.1.3
+++ pgp/src/random.c	2018/04/24 16:45:18	1.1.1.9
@@ -1,721 +1,706 @@
-/**********************************************************************
-	random.c - C source code for random number generation - 19 Nov 86
-	(c) Copyright 1986 by Philip Zimmermann.  All rights reserved.  
-
-	Revised Jul 88 by PRZ and again Dec 88 by Allan Hoeltje
-		to use IBM PC 8253 timer0 for a faster counter.
-	Revised Apr 89 by PRZ to recycle random bytes.
-	Revised 29 Jul 91 by PRZ for use in more limited environments.
-	Later revised by several other folks to run in difficult environments
-	such as Unix, VAX/VMS and others.
-	Revised 2 Sep 92 by Peter Gutmann and PRZ to use MD5 to distill 
-	high quality randomness down from low-grade random noise.
-
-	This code generates truly random numbers derived from a counter that is 
-	incremented continuously while the keyboard is scanned for user input.
-	Every time the user touches a key, the least significant bits of the 
-	counter are pushed on a stack.  Later, this supply of random bytes can
-	be popped off the stack by applications requiring stochastic numbers.
-	Cryptographic applications require this kind of randomness.
-
-	The only requirement to make this work is that keypress must be called 
-	frequently, and/or getkey must be called to read the keyboard.  
-
-	Note that you can only get as many random bytes as the number of
-	bytes accumulated by the user touching the keyboard.
-**********************************************************************/
-
-#include 	<string.h>
-#include 	<time.h>
-#include	"random.h"
-#include	"language.h"
-#ifdef  M_XENIX
-long time();
-#endif
-#ifdef UNIX
-#define	clock	Clock
-#endif
-
-/*	pseudorand() is used mainly for debugging while porting to a new
-	machine-- it makes reproducible sequences, which makes debugging
-	easier.  To use it as the source of random numbers, define
-	PSEUDORANDOM.  Warning:  Don't do this for actual applications.
-*/
-static int randseed=0; /* used only by pseudorand() function. */
-int pseudorand(void)
-/*	Home-grown 16-bit LCG pseudorandom generator. */
-{	randseed = (randseed*31421 + 6927) & 0xffff;
-	return (randseed);
-}	/* pseudorand */
-
-
-#ifndef PSEUDORANDOM		/* use truly random numbers */
-
-/* #define USEPCTIMER */ /* use fast hardware timer on IBM PC or AT or clone */
-/* #define DEBUG */
-
-/*	If operating system shields keyboard event timings from user, then 
-	we can't use any hardware or software timer logic to time events.
-	This is a messy situation, so we have special logic to handle
-	it, defining the symbol CRUDE to compile special code. 
-	This may be needed in some multiuser Unix systems, for example.
-*/
-#ifdef CRUDE /* No environmental support to capture keyboard event times */
-#undef USEPCTIMER
-#endif	/* CRUDE */
-
-#include	<stdio.h>	/* for putchar() and printf() */
-
-/* Prototypes for kbhit() (whether the keyboard has been hit) and getch()
-   (like getchar() but no echo, no buffering).  Not available under some
-   implementations */
-
-int kbhit( void );
-int getch( void );
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-#define DEBUGprintf1(x) fprintf(stderr,x)
-#define DEBUGprintf2(x,y) fprintf(stderr,x,y)
-#else
-#define DEBUGprintf1(x)
-#define DEBUGprintf2(x,y)
-#endif
-
-
-int randcount = 0 ;		/* # of random bytes accumulated in pool */
-static byte randpool[256] = {0} ;	/* pool of truly random bytes */
-static int recyclecount = 0 ;	/* # of recycled random bytes accumulated */
-static byte recyclepool[256] = {0} ; /* pool of recycled random bytes */
-static int recycleptr = 0;	/* points to next byte to grab in recyclepool */
-
-/* fastcounter is a free-running counter incremented in main event loop. */
-static unsigned fastcounter = 0;	/* not needed if we can use the PC timer. */
-static unsigned lastcounter = 0;
-static char toofast = 0;
-/* toofast indicates keystroke rejected because it was typed too fast */
-
-#ifdef CRUDE 
-static boolean capturemode = FALSE;
-#endif	/* CRUDE */
-
-#ifdef AMIGA
-int aecho;
-#endif
-
-/* Information needed by the MD5 code for distilling large quantities of
-   semi-random information into a small amount of highly-random information.
-   This works as follows:
-
-   Initially we have no random information.  Whenever we add more slightly
-   random data, we put it in the MD5 data field and run MD5 over the
-   random byte pool.  This propagates the randomness in the data evenly
-   throughout the pool due to the avalanche effect of the MD5 transformation.
-   The randomness transformation is carried out inside capturecounter() when
-   the data is entered, and is transparent to the operation of the rest of
-   the code.
-
-   The use of this randomness-distillation can be turned off by toggling the
-   following define in case the randomness code needs to be run on a
-   washing-machine controller or somesuch.
-*/
-
-#define USE_MD5		/* Turn on MD5 randomization */
-
-#ifdef USE_MD5
-void Transform( unsigned long *seedBuffer, unsigned long *data );
-byte seedBuffer[ 64 ];			/* Buffer for MD5 seed value */
-boolean isInitialised = FALSE;	/* Whether buffer has been inited */
-byte iv[ 16 ];					/* IV for MD5 transformation */
-#endif	/* USE_MD5 */
-
-#ifdef USEPCTIMER	/* we will use fast hardware timer on IBM PC */
-/* #include <conio.h> */	/* function definitions for inp() and outp() */
-/* outp() and inp() works only for Microsoft C for IBM PC or AT */
-/* timer0 on 8253-5 on IBM PC or AT tics every .84 usec. */
-#define timer0		0x40	/* 8253 timer 0 port */
-#define timercntl	0x43	/* 8253 control register */
-#define timer0rwl	0x00	/* read lo/hi bytes of cntr 2 with latch */
-#define timer0rnl	0x30	/* read lo/hi bytes of cntr 2 w/o latch */
-
-static byte latched_hitimer = 0; /* captured by keyboard ISR */
-static byte latched_lotimer = 0; /* captured by keyboard ISR */
-/* when kbisr captures timer, timer_latched is set. */
-static boolean timer_latched = FALSE;
-
-static void kbisr(void)	/* Keyboard Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) */
-/*
-	kbisr should be called on the way into, or on the way out of,
-	or from within the DOS keyboard ISR, as long as it gets called
-	at the time of a keyboard interrupt.  Assumes that the real
-	DOS keyboard ISR captures the keystroke in the normal way.
-	Only the hardware timer counter is captured by the kbisr routine,
-	leaving the actual keystroke capture to the normal DOS keyboard ISR.
-	We indicate that a timer capture has taken place by setting 
-	timer_latched.
-
-	NOTE: WE STILL NEED TO FIND A WAY to connect this subroutine with the 
-	normal keyboard ISR, so that kbisr gets called when there's a keyboard
-	interrupt.
-*/
-{	outp(timercntl,timer0rwl);
-	latched_lotimer = inp(timer0);
-	latched_hitimer = inp(timer0);
-	timer_latched = TRUE;
-}	/* kbisr */
-
-static unsigned short pctimer0(void)
-{
-/*	Reads and returns the hardware 8253 timer0 on the PC or AT
-**	or clone, shifted right 1 bit.
-**
-**	DO NOT SET THE HARDWARE COUNTER TO ZERO. It is already initialized
-**	by the system to be used by the clock.  It is set up in mode 3
-**	(square wave rate generator) and counts down by 2 from 0 (0xFFFF+1)
-**	to produce an 18.2 Hz square wave.  We may, however, READ the
-**	lo and hi bytes without causing any problems.  BUT just
-**	remember that the lo byte will always be even (since it is
-**	counting by two).
-**
-**	Note that we can not use counter 1 since it is tied to the
-**	dynamic RAM refresh hardware.  Counter 2 is tied to the 8255
-**	PPI chip to do things like sound.  Though it would be safe to
-**	use counter 2 it is not desirable since we would have to turn
-**	the speaker on in order to make the timer count!  Normally one
-**	sets counter 2 to mode 3 (square wave generator) to sound the
-**	speaker.  You can set mode 2 (pulse generator) and the speaker
-**	hardly makes any sound at all, a click when you turn it on and
-**	a click when you turn it off.  Counter 0 should be safe if
-**	we only read the counter bytes.
-**
-**	WARNING:  To use the hardware timer the way it really should be
-**	used, we ought to capture it via a keyboard interrupt service
-**	routine (ISR).	Otherwise, we may experience weaknesses in randomness
-**	due to harmonic relationships between the hardware counter frequency
-**	and the keyboard software polling frequency.  Unfortunately, this
-**	implementation does not currently use keyboard interrupts to
-**	capture the counter.  This is not a problem if we don't use the
-**	hardware counter, but instead use the software counter fastcounter.
-**	Thus, the hardware counter should not be used at all, unless we
-**	support it with an ISR.
-*/
-	unsigned short t ;
-	/* See if timer has been latched by kbisr(). */
-	if (!timer_latched) /* The timer was not already latched. */
-		kbisr();	/* latch timer */
-	/* return latched timer and clear latch */
-	t = ( 	(((unsigned short) latched_hitimer) << 8) |
-		 ((unsigned short) latched_lotimer)
-		) >> 1 ;
-	timer_latched = FALSE;
-	return (t) ;
-}	/* pctimer0 */
-
-#endif	/* ifdef USEPCTIMER */
-
-
-/* keybuf is used only by keypress(), getkey(), and capturecounter(). */
-static short keybuf = 0;
-
-
-#ifdef VMS
-
-extern unsigned long	vms_clock_bits[2];	/* VMS Hardware Clock */
-extern const long	vms_ticks_per_update;	/* Clock update int. */
-
-#endif /* VMS */
-
-void capturecounter(void)
-/*	Push a fast counter on the random stack.  Should be called when
-**	the user touches a key or clicks the mouse.
-*/
-{
-	int dt, i, j;
-#ifndef USE_MD5
-	static unsigned int accum = 0;
-#endif /* USE_MD5 */
-	static byte abits = 0;	/* number of accumulated bits in accum */
-	unsigned int accum1;
-
-#define cbitsmask ((1 << cbits)-1)
-
-#ifdef CRUDE /* No environmental support to capture keyboard event times. */
-	if (!capturemode)
-		return;	/* only captures during randaccum function */
-#endif	/* CRUDE */
-
-	/*	fastcounter only contains timing information, in the form of a 
-		free-running timer, either hardware or software.
-		accum1 contains stuff from fastcounter and other sources,
-		like the actual key the user hit.
-	*/
-
-#if defined(USEPCTIMER) /* we will use fast hardware timer on IBM PC */
-#define cbits 8		/* number of bits of counter to capture each time */
-	fastcounter = pctimer0();	/* capture hardware timer */
-#else
-#if defined(CRUDE)			/* no fast hardware timer available */
-#define cbits 2
-#else	/* not CRUDE */
-#ifndef cbits
-#define cbits 4		/* number of bits of counter to capture each time */
-#endif
-#ifdef VMS
-#define cbits 2	/* fewer bits because VMS timer is so slow (100 Hz) */
-	/* Capture fast system timer: */
-	SYS$GETTIM(vms_clock_bits);
-#ifdef TEST_COUNTER
-	fprintf(stderr," time %10ol %10ol\n",vms_clock_bits[0],vms_clock_bits[1]);
-#endif
-	/* vms_clock_bits[0] and vms_ticks_per_update are 32-bits each. */
-	fastcounter = vms_clock_bits[0] / vms_ticks_per_update;
-#endif /* VMS */
-#endif /* not CRUDE */
-#endif	/* not USEPCTIMER */
-
-#ifndef CRUDE	/* keyboard timings are available */
-	dt = fastcounter - lastcounter;
-	if (dt < 0)		/* timer rolled over past zero */
-		dt = -dt;	/* absolute value of time elapsed */
-#ifdef TEST_COUNTER
-	fprintf(stderr,"<dt=%6u>\n", dt);
-#endif
-	if ( ((unsigned) dt) < (unsigned)(1 << (cbits + 2)))
-	{
-		toofast++;	/* indicate a too-fast keystroke */
-		return;	/* only captures if enough time has passed */
-	}
-#endif /* not CRUDE */
-
-	lastcounter = fastcounter;	/* latch timer info */
-
-#ifdef USE_MD5
-	/* Initialise the MD5 info if necessary */
-	if( !isInitialised )	/* we probably shouldn't bother */
-	{	memset(seedBuffer, 0, 64);
-		memset(iv, 0, 16);
-		isInitialised = TRUE;
-	}
-
-	/*	Add the slightly-random data to the MD5 input buffer.  Currently we
-		just add a few bytes of environmental noise, but we could mix in 
-		up to 512 bits worth.
-	*/
-	seedBuffer[ 0 ] = keybuf;	/* actual character user typed */
-	seedBuffer[ 1 ] = lastcounter & 0xFF;
-	seedBuffer[ 2 ] = lastcounter >> 8;
-	accum1 = ( int ) clock();			/* clock ticks */
-	seedBuffer[ 3 ] = accum1 & 0xFF;
-	seedBuffer[ 4 ] = accum1 >> 8;
-	accum1 = ( int ) time(NULL);		/* seconds */
-	seedBuffer[ 5 ] = accum1 & 0xFF;
-	seedBuffer[ 6 ] = accum1 >> 8;
-	/* The preceding "noise quantum" has only cbits worth of randomness. */
-
-	/* Now use MD5 to diffuse the randomness in these bits over the random
-	   byte pool, raising the salinity of randomness in the pool.  The
-	   transformation is carried out by "encrypting" the data in CFB mode
-	   with MD5 as the block cipher */
-	for(i = 0; i < sizeof(randpool); i += 16)
-	{
-		Transform((unsigned long *) iv, (unsigned long *) seedBuffer);
-		for(j = 0; j < 16; j++)
-			randpool[i+j] ^= iv[j];
-		memcpy(iv, randpool+i, 16);
-	}
-
-	/*
-		Now the somewhat dubious bit:  In order to make this fit in with
-		the existing code, we use the existing mechanism of keeping track
-		of a high-water mark in the buffer.  This is actually reasonably
-		realistic, since it keeps a count of what percentage of the full
-		buffer is random enough-- measuring the "molarity" of solution. 
-		However when it comes time to re-randomize the buffer in
-		randombyte(), it would probably be better to use the above
-		transformation than the existing randombyte() code.  I've left it 
-		as is to keep it as compatible as possible.
-	*/
-
-	abits += cbits;		/* Update count of bits of randomness */
-	while (abits >= 8)
-	{	/* We've got another byte's worth, increment the buffer pointer */
-		if (randcount < sizeof(randpool))
-			randcount++; /* not a byte counter-- now a molarity of randomness */
-		abits -= 8;
-	}
-#else	/* not USE_MD5 */
-	/* combine several sources to attempt maximum randomness... */
-	accum1 = keybuf;		/* actual keystroke */
-	accum1 += lastcounter;	/* add latched timer info */
-	accum1 += clock();		/* clock ticks */
-	accum1 += time(NULL);	/* seconds */
-
-	accum1 ^= (accum1 >> cbits);	/* Fold upper and lower bits */
-
-	/* slide some new bits into the bit accumulator: */
-	accum = (accum << cbits) | (unsigned int) (accum1 & cbitsmask);
-	abits += cbits;
-	while (abits >= 8)	/* another byte's worth of bits accumulated */
-	{	if (randcount < sizeof(randpool))
-			/* take lower byte of accum */
-			randpool[randcount++] = accum;
-		abits -= 8;
-		accum >>= 8;
-	}
-#endif /* not USE_MD5 */
-#undef cbitsmask
-}	/* capturecounter */
-
-
-/* Because these truly random bytes are so unwieldy to accumulate,
-   they can be regarded as a precious resource.  Unfortunately,
-   cryptographic key generation algorithms may require a great many
-   random bytes while searching about for large random prime numbers.
-   Fortunately, they need not all be truly random.  We only need as
-   many truly random bytes as there are bytes in the large prime we
-   are searching for.  These random bytes can be recycled and modified
-   via pseudorandom numbers until the key is generated, without losing
-   any of the integrity of randomness of the final key.
-*/
-
-
-static void randstir(void)
-/* Stir up the recycled random number bin, via a pseudorandom generator */
-{	int i;
-	i = recyclecount;
-	while (i--)
-		recyclepool[i] ^= (byte) pseudorand();
-	DEBUGprintf2(" Stirring %d recycled bytes. ",recyclecount);
-}	/* randstir */
-
-
-short randload(short bitcount)
-/*	Flushes stale recycled random bits and copies a fresh supply of raw 
-	random bits from randpool to recyclepool.  Returns actual number of 
-	bits transferred. */
-{	int bytecount;
-	bytecount = (bitcount+7)/8;
-	bytecount = min(bytecount,randcount);
-	randflush();	/* reset recyclecount, discarding recyclepool */
-	while (bytecount--)
-		recyclepool[recyclecount++] = randpool[--randcount];
-	DEBUGprintf2("\nAllocating %d recycleable random bytes. ",recyclecount);
-	return(recyclecount*8);
-}	/* randload */
-
-
-void randflush(void)	/* destroys pool of recycled random numbers */
-/* Ensures no sensitive data remains in memory that can be recovered later. */
-{	recyclecount = sizeof (recyclepool);
-	while (recyclecount)
-		recyclepool[--recyclecount]=0;
-	/* recyclecount is left at 0 */
-	recycleptr = 0;
-	memset(seedBuffer, 0, 64);
-	memset(iv, 0, 16);
-}	/* randflush */
-
-
-short randombyte(void)
-/*	Returns truly random byte from pool, or a pseudorandom value
-**	if pool is empty.  It is recommended that the caller check
-**	the value of randcount before calling randombyte.
-*/
-{	
-	/* First try to get a cheap recycled random byte, if there are any. */
-	if (recyclecount)	/* nonempty recycled pool */
-	{	if (++recycleptr >= recyclecount)	/* ran out? */
-		{	recycleptr = 0;	/* ran out of recycled random numbers */
-			randstir();	/* stir up recycled bits */
-		}
-		return (recyclepool[recycleptr]);
-	}
-
-	/* Empty recycled pool.  Try a more expensive fresh random byte. */
-	if (randcount)	/* nonempty random pool--return a very random number */
-		return (randpool[--randcount]);
-
-	/* Alas, fresh random pool is empty.  Get a pseudorandom byte.
-	   Pseudorandom numbers are bad for cryptographic applications.
-	   Although we will return a pseudorandom byte in the low order byte,
-	   indicate error by making the result negative in the high byte.
-	*/
-	/* DEBUGprintf1("\007Warning: random pool empty! "); */
-	return ( (pseudorand() & 0xFF) ^ (-1) );
-}	/* randombyte */
-
-
-boolean keypress(void)	/* TRUE iff keyboard input ready */
-{	/* Accumulates random numbers by timing user keystrokes. */
-#ifndef CRUDE
-	static short lastkey = 0; /* used to detect autorepeat key sequences */
-	static short next_to_lastkey = 0; /* allows a single repeated key */
-
-#ifndef USEPCTIMER	/* no fast hardware timer available */
-	fastcounter++;	/* used in lieu of fast hardware timer counter */
-#endif	/* ifndef USEPCTIMER */
-
-	if (keybuf & 0x100)	/* bit 8 means keybuf contains valid data */
-		return( TRUE );	/* key was hit the last time thru */
-
-	if (kbhit() == 0)	/* keyboard was not hit */
-		return( FALSE );
-
-	keybuf = getch() | 0x100; /* set data latch bit */
-
-	/* Keyboard was hit.  Decide whether to call capturecounter... */
-
-	/*  Guard against typahead buffer defeating fastcounter's randomness.
-	**  This could be a problem for multicharacter sequences generated
-	**  by a function key expansion or by the user generating keystrokes
-	**  faster than our event loop can handle them.  Only the last
-	**  character of a multicharacter sequence will trigger the counter
-	**  capture.  Also, don't let the keyboard's autorepeat feature
-	**  produce nonrandom counter capture.  However, we do allow a 
-	**  single repeated character to trigger counter capture, because
-	**  many english words have double letter combinations, and it's 
-	**  unlikely a typist would exploit the autorepeat feature to
-	**  type a simple double letter sequence.
-	**  We have some separate checks in capturecounter() to guard
-	**  against other reasons for characters coming in too fast.
-	*/
-
-	if (kbhit() == 0)	/* nothing in typahead buffer */
-	{	/* don't capture counter if key repeated */
-		if (keybuf != lastkey)
-			capturecounter(); /* read random noise from environment */
-		else if (keybuf != next_to_lastkey) /* allow single repeat */
-			capturecounter();
-		next_to_lastkey = lastkey;
-		lastkey = keybuf;
-	}
-	return( TRUE );
-#else	/* CRUDE */
-	return(FALSE);
-#endif
-}	/* keypress */
-
-
-short getkey(void)	/* Returns data from keyboard (no echo). */
-{	/* Also accumulates random numbers via keypress(). */
-#ifndef CRUDE
-	while(! keypress() );		/* loop until key is pressed. */
-	return( keybuf &= 0xff);	/* clear latch bit 8 */
-#else
-	return(keybuf = getch() & 0xff);
-#endif
-}	/* getkey */
-
-
-#define BS	8		/* ASCII backspace */
-#define CR	13		/* ASCII carriage return */
-#define LF	10		/* ASCII linefeed */
-#define DEL 0177    /* ASCII delete */
-
-/* We will need a series of truly random bits for key generation.
-   In most implementations, our random number supply is derived from
-   random keyboard delays rather than a hardware random number
-   chip.  So we will have to ensure we have a large enough pool of
-   accumulated random numbers from the keyboard.  Later, randombyte
-   will return bytes one at a time from the accumulated pool of
-   random numbers.  For ergonomic reasons, we may want to prefill
-   this random pool all at once initially.  The randaccum function
-   prefills a pool of random bits.
-*/
-
-#if defined(UNIX) || defined(AMIGA) || defined(VMS)
-#define NEEDBREAK
-void ttycbreak();
-void ttynorm();
-#endif
-
-#ifndef CRUDE	/* We can measure keyboard event times accurately. */
-
-void randaccum(short bitcount)	/* Get this many random bits ready */
-{	short nbytes;
-	char c;
-	int col = 0;
-	unsigned long timer;
-	int fasts_rejected = 0;			/* number of too-fast keystrokes */
-
-	nbytes = min((bitcount+7)/8,sizeof(randpool));
-	fasts_rejected = 0;	/* number of too-fast keystrokes */
-	toofast = 0;	/* clear too-fast latch */
-
-	if (randcount < nbytes)	/* if we don't have enough already */
-	{	fprintf(stderr,
-PSTR("\nWe need to generate %d random bytes.  This is done by measuring the\
-\ntime intervals between your keystrokes.  Please enter some text on your\
-\nkeyboard, at least %d nonrepeating keystrokes, until you hear the beep:\n"),
-			nbytes-randcount, (8*(nbytes-randcount)+cbits-1)/cbits);
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-		ttycbreak();
-#endif
-		/* display counter to show progress */
-
-		while (randcount < nbytes)
-		{
-			fprintf(stderr,"\r%3d ",nbytes-randcount);
-			fflush(stderr);
-			c=getkey();
-			if (toofast)
-			{	fasts_rejected++;	/* keep score */
-				toofast = 0;		/* reset latch */
-				putc('?', stderr);	/* indicate trouble */
-			}
-			else 
-				putc('.', stderr);
-		}
-
-		fprintf(stderr,PSTR("\007*\n-Enough, thank you.\n"));
-
-		if (fasts_rejected > 2)	/* Did user type too fast? */
-			fprintf(stderr,PSTR("(Ignored %d keystrokes that were typed too fast.)\n"), 
-				fasts_rejected);
-
-		/* Clean up typeahead for at least 1 full second... */
-		timer = time(NULL) + 1;	/* need at least 1 second of quiet */
-		while ((unsigned long) time(NULL) <= timer)
-		{	if (keypress())	/* user touched a key, reset timer */
-			{	getkey();
-				timer = time(NULL) + 1;
-			}
-		}
-
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-		ttynorm();
-#endif /* !NEEDBREAK */
-	}
-}	/* randaccum */
-
-#endif	/* not CRUDE */
-
-
-#ifdef CRUDE	/* We cannot measure keyboard event times accurately. */
-
-/*	If we can't measure keyboard event timings, use the actual keys 
-	typed as the source of randomness.
-
-	This is a really lousy way to make random numbers.  We will only use
-	this method as a last resort, only if this machine does not allow
-	keyboard events to be timed accurately.  It's better than nothing.
-	The other randaccum function listed above is much better, if the
-	CRUDE symbol is undefined and the environment will support it.
-
-	We have improved this scheme somewhat by using a good hashing
-	function (MD5) on the user input before capturing it in the 
-	random pool.  This is done in function capturecounter().
-*/
-
-void randaccum(short bitcount)	/* Get this many random bits ready */
-{	short nbytes;
-	char c, flushbuf[80];
-	nbytes = min((bitcount+7)/8,sizeof(randpool));
-
-	randcount = 0;	/* start with nothing in pool. */
-	capturemode = TRUE;	/* enable capture of random keys */
-	fastcounter += time(0);	/* start with time of day, if available */
-
-	fprintf(stderr,PSTR("\nWe need to generate %d random bytes.\
-\nPlease enter at least %d random keystrokes, as random\
-\nas you can possibly make them.\n"),
-		nbytes-randcount, (8*(nbytes-randcount)+cbits-1)/cbits);
-	while (randcount < nbytes)
-	{	c=getkey();
-		capturecounter();
-	}
-	/*
-	 * CRUDE mode must work in normal tty mode, so we can't
-	 * use keypress() to flush input.
-	 */
-#ifdef AMIGA
-    while(keypress()) getch();
-#else
-	fgets(flushbuf, sizeof(flushbuf), stdin);
-#endif
-	fprintf(stderr,PSTR("\007 -Enough, thank you.\n"));
-
-	capturemode = FALSE;	/* don't capture any more keys */
-
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-	ttynorm();
-#endif
-}	/* randaccum */
-
-#endif	/* CRUDE */
-
-
-int getstring(char *strbuf, int maxlen, boolean echo)
-/*	Gets string from user, with no control characters allowed.
-	Also accumulates random numbers by calling getkey().
-	maxlen is max length allowed for string.
-	echo is TRUE iff we should echo keyboard to screen.
-	Returns null-terminated string in strbuf.
-*/
-{	short i;
-	char c;
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-	ttycbreak();
-#endif
-#ifdef AMIGA
-    aecho = (int)echo;
-    echo = FALSE;   /* echo is done in getch */
-#endif  /* AMIGA */
-	fflush(stdout);
-	i=0;
-	while (TRUE)
-	{	fflush(stderr);
-		c = getkey();
-		if (c==BS || c==DEL)
-		{	if (i)
-			{	if (echo)
-				{	fputc(BS,stderr);
-					fputc(' ',stderr);
-					fputc(BS,stderr);
-				}
-				i--;
-			}
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (c < ' ' && c != LF && c != CR)
-		{	putc('\007', stderr);
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (echo) fputc(c,stderr);
-		if (c==CR)
-		{	if (echo) fputc(LF,stderr);
-			break;
-		}
-		if (c==LF)
-			break;
-		if (c=='\n')
-			break;
-		strbuf[i++] = c;
-		if (i>=maxlen)
-		{	fprintf(stderr,"\007*\n");	/* -Enough! */
-			while (keypress())
-				getkey();	/* clean up any typeahead */
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	strbuf[i] = '\0';	/* null termination of string */
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-	ttynorm();
-#endif
-	return(i);		/* returns string length */
-}	/* getstring */
-
-
-#endif			/* ifndef PSEUDORANDOM */
-
-void flush_input()
-{
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-	ttycbreak();
-#endif
-	while (keypress())	/* flush typahead buffer */
-		getkey();
-#ifdef NEEDBREAK
-	ttynorm();
-#endif
-}
-
+/*
+ * True and cryptographic random number generation.
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright 1990-1996 by Philip Zimmermann.  All rights reserved.
+ * The author assumes no liability for damages resulting from the use
+ * of this software, even if the damage results from defects in this
+ * software.  No warranty is expressed or implied.
+ *
+ * Note that while most PGP source modules bear Philip Zimmermann's
+ * copyright notice, many of them have been revised or entirely written
+ * by contributors who frequently failed to put their names in their
+ * code.  Code that has been incorporated into PGP from other authors
+ * was either originally published in the public domain or is used with
+ * permission from the various authors.
+ *
+ * PGP is available for free to the public under certain restrictions.
+ * See the PGP User's Guide (included in the release package) for
+ * important information about licensing, patent restrictions on
+ * certain algorithms, trademarks, copyrights, and export controls.
+ *
+ * Written by Colin Plumb.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <signal.h>	/* For SIGINT */
+#include <time.h>
+
+#ifdef AMIGA      /* Includes for timer -- RKNOP */
+#include <devices/timer.h>
+#include <exec/memory.h>
+#include <exec/libraries.h>
+#include <proto/dos.h>
+#include <proto/timer.h>
+#include <proto/exec.h>
+#endif /* AMIGA */
+
+#ifdef __PUREC__
+#include <ext.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "system.h"	/* For ttycbreak, getch, etc. */
+#include "idea.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "noise.h"
+#include "language.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "fileio.h"	/* For FOPRBIN */
+#include "pgp.h"	/* For globalRandseedName */
+#include "randpool.h"
+#ifdef MACTC5
+#include "Macutil2.h"
+#include "Macutil3.h"
+#include "TimeManager.h"
+#include <unix.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * As of PGP 2.6.2, the randseed.bin file has been expanded.  An explanation
+ * of how the whole thing works in in order, as people are always suspiscious
+ * of the random number generator.  (After the xorbytes bug in 2.6, perhaps
+ * you should be.)  There are two random number generators in PGP.  One
+ * is the "cryptRand" family, which is based on X9.17, but uses IDEA instead
+ * of 2-key EDE triple-DES.  This is the generator with a lot of peer review.
+ * The implementation is in idea.c.
+ * The second is the "trueRand" family, which attempt to accurately measure
+ * the entropy available from keyboard I/O.  It keeps a lot more state.
+ * The implementation of this is in randpool.c.
+ * Originally, the trueRand generator was only used for generating primes,
+ * and the cryptRand for generating IDEA session keys.  But things have
+ * become a bit more complex.  In particular, the X9.17 specification
+ * wants a source of high-resolution time-of-day information, as a source
+ * of some "true" randomness to throw in.  So we use the trueRand pool
+ * for that.
+ * The cryptRand functions keep a state file around, usually named
+ * randseed.bin, for a seed, as the X9.17 generator requires 24 bytes of
+ * known initial information.
+ * This data in this file is carefully "washed" before and after use to
+ * help ensure that if the file is captured or altered, the keys will
+ * not be too vulnerable.  A washing consists of an encryption in PGP's
+ * usual CFB mode of the material coming from or being written to the
+ * randseed.bin file on disk.  Assuming the cipher is strong, the effects
+ * of the wash are as difficult to predict as the key that is used is
+ * difficult to guess.
+ * Beforehand, we use the MD5 of the file being encrypted as an additional
+ * source of randomness (on the theory that an attacker trying to break
+ * a session key probably doesn't have the plaintext, or he wouldn't need
+ * to bother), and use that as an IDEA key (with a fixed IV of zero)
+ * to encrypt the randseed.bin data.
+ * After generating an IDEA key and IV, some more random bytes are generated
+ * to reinitialize randseed.bin, and these are encrypted in the same manner
+ * as the PGP message before being written to disk, on the assumption that
+ * if an attacker can decrypt that, they can decrypt the message directly
+ * and not bother attacking the randseed.bin file.
+ * The previous code only saved the 24 bytes needed by the X9.17 algorithm.
+ * But in 2.6.2, we decided to make the randseed.bin file substantially
+ * larger to hold more information that a would-be attacker must guess.
+ * There are two reasons for this:
+ * - Every time you run PGP, especially when responding to one of PGP's
+ *   prompts, PGP samples the keystrokes for use as random numbers.
+ *   It is a shame to throw this entropy (randomness) away just because
+ *   there is no need for it in the current invocation of PGP.
+ * - A feature was added to 2.6.2 to generate files full of random bytes
+ *   for other programs to use as key material.  In this case, we haven't
+ *   got a message we're encrypting to take some entropy from, and we may
+ *   be asked to generate more than 24 random bytes, so there should be
+ *   more than 24 bytes of seed material to work from.
+ * The implementation is added on to the previous one, to offer assurance
+ * that it is no weaker.
+ * When the cryptRand generator is opened, the file is washed (if possible)
+ * and the first 24 bytes are fed to the cryptographic RNG, while the
+ * remainder is added to the trueRand random number pool.
+ * When saving, the randseed.bin file is refilled with newly generated
+ * bytes, again washed if possible.  It turns out (if you study the
+ * X9.17 RNG) that each of the 2^64 possible timestamp information
+ * values used in generating each 8 bytes of output generates a output
+ * value, so the entropy in the trueRand pool is put to good use; this
+ * is not just generating more data from 24 bytes of seed.
+ * The random pool is opened and saved with a washing key when
+ * generating a session key (see make_random_ideakey in crypto.c),
+ * but it is also opened (harmless if alreasy open) and saved
+ * (harmless if already saved) without a washing key in the exitPGP routine,
+ * to mix in any entropy collected in this invocation of PGP even if
+ * a session key was not generated.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The new randseed size, big enough to hold the full context of the cryptRand
+ * and trueRand generators.  With the current RANDPOOLBITS of 3072 (384 bytes),
+ * that's 408 bytes.  It's useless to make it any larger, although if
+ * RANDPOOLBITS is increased, it might be an idea to keep this smaller than
+ * one disk block on all systems (512 bytes is a good figure to use)
+ * so we don't change the space requirements for randseed.bin.
+ */
+#define RANDSEED_BYTES	(RANDPOOLBITS/8 + 24)
+/* Have we read in the randseed.bin file? */
+static boolean randSeedOpen = 0;
+static struct IdeaRandContext randContext;
+
+/*
+ * Load the RNG state from the randseed.bin file on disk.
+ * Returns 0 on success, <0 on error.
+ *
+ * If cfb is non-zero, prewashes the data by encrypting with it.
+ */
+int
+cryptRandOpen(struct IdeaCfbContext *cfb)
+{
+	byte buf[256];
+	int len;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	if (randSeedOpen)
+		return 0;	/* Already open */
+
+	f = fopen(globalRandseedName, FOPRBIN);
+	if (!f)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* First get the bare minimum 24 bytes we need for the IDEA RNG */
+	len = fread((char *)buf, 1, 24, f);
+	if (cfb)
+		ideaCfbEncrypt(cfb, buf, buf, 24);
+	ideaRandInit(&randContext, buf, buf+16);
+	randSeedOpen = TRUE;
+	if (len != 24) { /* Error */
+		fclose(f);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Read any extra into the random pool */
+	for (;;) {
+		len = fread((char *)buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f);
+		if (len <= 0)
+			break;
+		if (cfb)
+			ideaCfbEncrypt(cfb, buf, buf, len);
+		randPoolAddBytes(buf, len);
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+	burn(buf);
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	PGPSetFinfo(globalRandseedName,'RSed','MPGP');
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Create a new state from the output of trueRandByte */
+void
+cryptRandInit(struct IdeaCfbContext *cfb)
+{
+	byte buf[24];
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++)
+		buf[i] = trueRandByte();
+	if (cfb)
+		ideaCfbEncrypt(cfb, buf, buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+	ideaRandInit(&randContext, buf, buf+16);
+	randSeedOpen = TRUE;
+	burn(buf);
+}
+
+byte
+cryptRandByte(void)
+{
+	if (!randSeedOpen)
+		cryptRandOpen((struct IdeaCfbContext *)0);
+	return ideaRandByte(&randContext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write out a file of random bytes.  If cfb is defined, wash it with the
+ * cipher.
+ */
+int
+cryptRandWriteFile(char const *name, struct IdeaCfbContext *cfb, unsigned bytes)
+{
+	byte buf[256];
+	FILE *f;
+	int i, len;
+
+	f = fopen(name, FOPWBIN);
+	if (!f)
+		return -1;
+
+	while (bytes) {
+		len = (bytes < sizeof(buf)) ? bytes : sizeof(buf);
+		for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+			buf[i] = ideaRandByte(&randContext);
+		if (cfb)
+			ideaCfbEncrypt(cfb, buf, buf, len);
+		i = fwrite(buf, 1, len, f);
+		if (i < len)
+			break;
+		bytes -= len;
+	}
+
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	PGPSetFinfo((char *)name,'RSed','MPGP');
+#endif
+
+	return (fclose(f) != 0 || bytes != 0) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new RNG state, encrypt it with the supplied key, and save it
+ * out to disk.
+ *
+ * When we encrypt a file, the saved data is "postwashed" using the
+ * same key and initial vector (including the repeated check bytes and
+ * everything) that is used to encrypt the user's message.
+ * The hope is that this "postwash" renders it is at least as hard to
+ * derive old session keys from randseed.bin as it is to crack the the
+ * message directly.
+ *
+ * The purpose of using EXACTLY the same encryption is to make sure that
+ * there isn't related, but different data floating around that can be
+ * used for cryptanalysis.
+ *
+ * This function is always called by exitPGP, without a washing encryption,
+ * so this function ignores that call if it has previously been called
+ * to save washed bytes.
+ */
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	boolean savedwashed = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+void
+cryptRandSave(struct IdeaCfbContext *cfb)
+{
+#ifndef MACTC5
+	static boolean savedwashed = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+	if (!randSeedOpen)
+		return;	/* Do nothing */
+
+	if (cfb)
+		savedwashed = TRUE;
+	else if (savedwashed)
+		return;	/* Don't re-save if it's already been saved washed. */
+
+	(void)cryptRandWriteFile(globalRandseedName, cfb, RANDSEED_BYTES);
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	PGPSetFinfo(globalRandseedName,'RSed','MPGP');
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * True random bit handling
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Because these truly random bytes are so unwieldy to accumulate,
+ * they can be regarded as a precious resource.  Unfortunately,
+ * cryptographic key generation algorithms may require a great many
+ * random bytes while searching about for large random prime numbers.
+ * Fortunately, they need not all be truly random.  We only need as
+ * many truly random bits as there are bits in the large prime we
+ * are searching for.  These random bytes can be recycled and modified
+ * via pseudorandom numbers until the key is generated, without losing
+ * any of the integrity of randomness of the final key.
+ *
+ * The technique used is a pool of random numbers, which bytes are
+ * taken from successively and, when the end is reached, the pool
+ * is stirred using an irreversible hash function.  Some (64 bytes)
+ * of the pool is not returned to ensure the sequence is not predictible
+ * from the values retriefed from trueRandByte().  To be precise,
+ * MD5Transform is used as a block cipher in CBC mode, and then the
+ * "key" (i.e. what is usually the material to be hashed) is overwritten
+ * with some of the just-generated random bytes.
+ *
+ * This is implemented in randpool.c; see that file for details.
+ *
+ * An estimate of the number of bits of true (Shannon) entropy in the
+ * pool is kept in trueRandBits.  This is incremented when timed
+ * keystrokes are available, and decremented when bits are explicitly
+ * consumed for some purpose (such as prime generation) or another.
+ *
+ * trueRandFlush is called to obliterate traces of old random bits after
+ * prime generation is completed.  (Primes are the most carefully-guarded
+ * values in PGP.)
+ */
+
+static unsigned trueRandBits = 0;	/* Bits of entropy in pool */
+
+#ifdef MACTC5
+#define CBITS 5
+#define TRByt 3
+#define TREvt 1
+
+static void perturb(rbits)
+int rbits;
+{	
+	spinner();
+	randPoolAddBytes((byte *) seedBuffer, 8);
+	trueRandBits +=rbits;
+	if (trueRandBits > RANDPOOLBITS)
+		trueRandBits = RANDPOOLBITS;
+	return;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* trueRandPending is bits to add to next accumulation request */
+static unsigned trueRandPending = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Destroys already-used random numbers.  Ensures no sensitive data
+ * remains in memory that can be recovered later.  This is called
+ * after RSA key generation, so speed is not critical, but security is.
+ * RSA key generation takes long enough that interrupts and other
+ * tasks are likely to have used a measurable and difficult-to-predict
+ * amount of real time, so there is some virtue in sampling the clocks
+ * with noise().
+ */
+void
+trueRandFlush(void)
+{
+	noise();
+	randPoolStir();	/* Destroy evidence of what primes were generated */
+	randPoolStir();
+	randPoolStir();
+	randPoolStir();	/* Make *really* certain */
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Consumes" count bits worth of entropy from the true random pool for some
+ * purpose, such as prime generation.
+ *
+ * Note that something like prime generation can end up calling trueRandByte
+ * more often than is implied by the count passed to trueRandClaim; this
+ * may happen if the random bit consumer is not perfectly efficient in its
+ * use of random bits.  For example, if a search for a suitable prime fails,
+ * the easiest thing to do is to get another load of random bits and try
+ * again.  It is perfectly acceptable if these bits are correlated with the
+ * bits used in the failed attempt, since they are discarded.
+ */
+void
+trueRandConsume(unsigned count)
+{
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	if( trueRandBits >= count )
+		trueRandBits -= count;
+	else
+		trueRandBits = 0;
+#else
+	assert (trueRandBits >= count);
+	trueRandBits -= count;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a truly random byte if any are available.  It degenerates to
+ * a pseudorandom value if there are none.  It is not an error to call
+ * this if none are available.  For example, it is called when generating
+ * session keys to add to other sources of cryptographic random numbers.
+ *
+ * This forces an accumulation if any extra random bytes are pending.
+ */
+int
+trueRandByte(void)
+{
+	if (trueRandPending)
+		trueRandAccum(0);
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	while( trueRandBits < 8 ) {
+		perturb(TRByt);
+		spinner();
+		}
+#endif
+
+	return randPoolGetByte();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an event (typically a keystroke) coded by "event"
+ * at a random time, add all randomness to the random pool,
+ * compute a (conservative) estimate of the amount, add it
+ * to the pool, and return the amount of randomness.
+ * (The return value is just for informational purposes.)
+ *
+ * Double events are okay, but three in a row is considered
+ * suspiscous and the randomness is counted as 0.
+ */
+unsigned
+trueRandEvent(int event)
+{
+	static int event1 = 0, event2 = 0;
+	word32 delta;
+	unsigned cbits;
+
+	delta = noise();
+	randPoolAddBytes((byte *)&event, sizeof(event));
+
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	perturb(TRByt);
+#endif
+
+	if (event == event1 && event == event2) {
+		cbits = 0;
+	} else {
+		event2 = event1;
+		event1 = event;
+
+		for (cbits = 0; delta; cbits++)
+			delta >>= 1;
+
+		/* Excessive paranoia? */
+#ifdef MACTC5
+		if (cbits > CBITS)
+			cbits = CBITS;
+#else
+		if (cbits > 8)
+			cbits = 8;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	trueRandBits += cbits;
+	if (trueRandBits > RANDPOOLBITS)
+		trueRandBits = RANDPOOLBITS;
+
+	return cbits;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Since getting random bits from the keyboard requires user attention,
+ * we buffer up requests for them until we can do one big request.
+ */
+void
+trueRandAccumLater(unsigned bitcount)
+{
+	trueRandPending += bitcount;	/* Wow, that was easy! :-) */
+#ifdef MACTC5
+	spinner();
+#endif
+}
+
+static void flush_input(void);
+
+#ifdef AMIGA  /* Globals used for timing here and in noise.c - RKNOP 940613 */
+struct Library *TimerBase=NULL;
+struct timerequest *TimerIO=NULL;
+union { struct timeval t;
+        struct EClockVal e;
+      } time0,time1;
+unsigned short use_eclock=0;
+#endif /* AMIGA */
+
+/*
+ * Performs an accumulation of random bits.  As long as there are fewer bits
+ * in the buffer than are needed (the number passed, plus pending bits),
+ * prompt for more.
+ */
+void
+trueRandAccum(unsigned count)	/* Get this many random bits ready */
+{
+	int c;
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(__MSDOS__)
+	time_t timer;
+#endif
+
+	count += trueRandPending;	/* Do deferred accumulation now */
+	trueRandPending = 0;
+
+	if (count > RANDPOOLBITS)
+		count = RANDPOOLBITS;
+
+	if (trueRandBits >= count)
+		return;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+LANG("\nWe need to generate %u random bits.  This is done by measuring the\
+\ntime intervals between your keystrokes.  Please enter some random text\
+\non your keyboard until you hear the beep:\n"), count-trueRandBits);
+
+	ttycbreak();
+
+#ifdef AMIGA  /* RKNOP 940613 */
+        TimerIO=(struct timerequest *)AllocMem(sizeof(struct timerequest),
+                                               MEMF_PUBLIC|MEMF_CLEAR);
+        if (TimerIO)
+        {  if (OpenDevice(TIMERNAME,UNIT_MICROHZ,(struct IORequest *)TimerIO,0))
+              TimerBase=NULL;
+           else
+           {  TimerBase=(struct Library *)TimerIO->tr_node.io_Device;
+              if (TimerBase->lib_Version>=36) /* Use E-clock instead */
+              {  use_eclock=1;
+                 CloseDevice((struct IORequest *)TimerIO);
+                 if (!OpenDevice(TIMERNAME,UNIT_ECLOCK,
+                                 (struct IORequest *)TimerIO,0))
+                    TimerBase=(struct Library *)TimerIO->tr_node.io_Device;
+                 else
+                    TimerBase=NULL;
+              }
+              else use_eclock=0;
+           }
+        }
+        else TimerBase=NULL;
+#endif /* AMIGA */
+
+	do {
+		/* display counter to show progress */
+		fprintf(stderr,"\r%4d ", count-trueRandBits);
+		fflush(stderr);	/* assure screen update */
+
+		flush_input();	/* If there's no delay, we can't use it */
+#ifdef MACTC5
+		StartTMCounter();
+#endif
+		c = getch();	/* always wait for input */
+#ifdef MSDOS
+		if (c == 3)
+			breakHandler(SIGINT);
+		if (c == 0)
+			c = getch() + 256;
+#endif
+		/* Print flag indicating acceptance (or not) */
+                /* putc a macro, not safe to have function as an arg!! */
+                fputc(trueRandEvent(c) ? '.' : '?' , stderr);
+#ifdef MACTC5
+		StopTMCounter();
+#endif
+	} while (trueRandBits < count);
+
+	fputs("\r   0 *", stderr);
+	fputs(LANG("\007 -Enough, thank you.\n"), stderr);
+
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(__MSDOS__)
+	/* Wait until one full second has passed without keyboard input */
+	do {
+		flush_input();
+		sleep(1);
+	} while (kbhit());
+#else
+#ifdef AMIGA       /* Added RKNOP 940608 */
+        Delay(50*1);    /* dos.library function, wait 1 second */
+        if (TimerBase) CloseDevice((struct IORequest *)TimerIO);
+        TimerBase=NULL;
+        if (TimerIO) FreeMem(TimerIO,sizeof(struct timerequest));
+        TimerIO=NULL;
+#else
+	sleep(1);
+	flush_input();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	ttynorm();
+}
+
+#ifndef EBCDIC                   /* already defined in usuals.h */
+#define BS 8
+#define LF 10
+#define CR 13
+#define DEL 127
+#endif
+
+#ifdef VMS
+int putch(int);
+#else
+#define putch(c) putc(c, stderr)
+#endif
+
+int
+getstring(char *strbuf, unsigned maxlen, int echo)
+/* Gets string from user, with no control characters allowed.
+ * Also accumulates random numbers.
+ * maxlen is max length allowed for string.
+ * echo is TRUE iff we should echo keyboard to screen.
+ * Returns null-terminated string in strbuf.
+ */
+{
+	unsigned i;
+	char c;
+
+	ttycbreak();
+
+#ifdef AMIGA     /* In case of -f (use stdio for plaintext input),
+                    use ReqTools for input from the user */
+        if (!IsInteractive(Input()))
+           return AmigaRequestString(strbuf,maxlen,echo);
+#endif
+
+	fflush(stdout);
+	i=0;
+	for (;;) {
+#ifndef VMS
+		fflush(stderr);
+#endif /* VMS */
+		c = getch();
+		trueRandEvent(c);
+#ifdef VMS
+		if (c == 25) {  /*  Control-Y detected */
+		    ttynorm();
+		    breakHandler(SIGINT);
+		}
+#endif /* VMS */
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined (__MSDOS__)
+		if (c == 3)
+			breakHandler(SIGINT);
+#endif
+		if (c==BS || c==DEL) {
+			if (i) {
+				if (echo) {
+					putch(BS);
+					putch(' ');
+					putch(BS);
+				}
+				i--;
+			} else {
+				putch('\007');
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (c < ' ' && c != LF && c != CR) {
+			putch('\007');
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined (__MSDOS__)
+			if (c == 3)
+				breakHandler(SIGINT);	
+			if (c == 0)
+				getch(); /* Skip extended key codes */
+#endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (echo)
+			putch(c);
+		if (c==CR) {
+			if (echo)
+				putch(LF);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (c==LF)
+			break;
+		if (c=='\n')
+			break;
+		strbuf[i++] = c;
+		if (i >= maxlen) {
+			fputs("\007*\n", stderr);	/* -Enough! */
+#if 0
+			while (kbhit())
+				getch();	/* clean up any typeahead */
+#endif
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	strbuf[i] = '\0';	/* null termination of string */
+
+	ttynorm();
+
+	return(i);		/* returns string length */
+} /* getstring */
+
+
+static void
+flush_input(void)
+{	/* on unix ttycbreak() will flush the input queue */
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined (__MSDOS__) || defined(MACTC5)
+	while (kbhit())	/* flush typahead buffer */
+		getch();
+#endif
+}